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Article 4

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET
J. HASKELL MURRAY ∗
ABSTRACT
During the last seven years, over thirty states have passed at
least one social enterprise statute. These social enterprise
statutes allow the formation of a plethora of new entity types,
including low-profit limited liability companies, benefit
corporations, benefit limited liability companies, public benefit
corporations, and social purpose corporations.
Social
enterprises have attracted increasing academic attention, but
virtually nothing has been written on if and how states are
competing for these entities. This Article attempts to fill that
void, while also providing a history of the social enterprise forms,
a comparative analysis, and recommendations for states that
wish to engage in jurisdictional competition in the social
enterprise law market.
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INTRODUCTION
In her iconic book The Genius of American Corporate Law, Professor
Roberta Romano claims “federalism spurs innovation in public policy
because of the incremental experimentation afforded by fifty laboratories of
states competing for citizens and firms.” 1 The legal academy has given
much attention to jurisdictional competition for traditional business
associations such as corporations and limited liability companies
(“LLCs”). 2 Delaware has long been recognized as the clear winner in the
1. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993) (first citing
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); then
citing COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Daphne A. Kenyon & John
Kincaid eds., 1991)).
2. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability
Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (2011); Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation
Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989); Larry E. Ribstein &
Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661 (2008);
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985).
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competition among the states for these traditional business associations,
with some academics arguing that the competition has been a “race to the
bottom” and others contending that the competition has been a “race to the
top.” 3 More recently, commentators have claimed other states do not now
pose much of a threat to Delaware’s dominance, and that the federal
government is the main check on Delaware’s power in the law market for
traditional business associations. 4 To date, the behavior surrounding
emerging social enterprise forms, such as low-profit limited liability
companies and benefit corporations, has not been thoroughly discussed or
analyzed. Also, unlike the situation with the more traditional business
associations, currently Delaware does not appear to be the dominant state in
the social enterprise law market.
Part I of this Article provides an overview and brief history of social
enterprise forms in the United States, along with discussion of the related,
early academic literature. Part II describes many of the innovations in the
social enterprise law area and the various iterations of these laws. Part III
asks why states are passing social enterprise laws, and provides a new
theory of jurisdictional positioning to describe states that are not engaged in
full competition but wish to remain poised to compete if the stakes are
raised. Part IV describes the various interest groups that are impacting the
passage and shape of social enterprise laws, including activists, managers,
politicians, and skeptics. Finally, Part V examines hand-collected data on
social enterprise forms, providing a description of the current social
enterprise landscape and offering advice to states that wish to compete for
social enterprises in the future. This Article concludes by drawing on the
Delaware experience to predict the characteristics of the winning state in
any future jurisdictional competition that may arise over social enterprises.
I. OVERVIEW OF U.S. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW AND LITERATURE
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (“L3Cs”)
The 2008 Vermont Low-Profit Limited Liability statute was both the
first L3C statute and the first social enterprise statute in the United States.
Since 2008, eight additional states and two federal tribal jurisdictions have

3. See, e.g., RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7–11 (1978) (race
to the bottom); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (race to the bottom); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and
Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984) (race to the top);
Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73.
4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 558, 604–05 (2002);
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591 (2003).
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passed L3C statutes. 5 Effective January 1, 2014, North Carolina became
the first of the nine original L3C states to repeal its L3C statute, though it
allowed previously formed L3Cs to continue to exist in the state.6 The L3C
concept is championed by Robert “Bob” Lang, the Chief Executive Officer
of The Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation.7 Mr. Lang
worked with attorneys on the L3C concept but is not a lawyer himself.8
L3C statutes were drafted, primarily, to target Program Related
Investments (“PRI”) from foundations, and thereby aid social enterprises in
their attempts to raise capital.9 The statutes mirror, in many respects, the
PRI regulations and often simply replace “investment” in the regulations
with “company” in the L3C statutes. 10 The L3C statutes require that the
L3C “significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable
or educational purposes” and require that the L3C “would not have been
formed but for the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of
charitable or educational purposes.” 11 The L3C statutes also require that
“[n]o significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the
appreciation of property” but the statutes make clear that the production of
5. Steven R. Chiodini & David A. Levitt, Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A Questionand-Answer Guide, 118 J. TAX’N 41, 41, 43 n.10 (2013) (listing Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, Oglala Sioux Tribe and the
Crow Indian Nation of Montana); see also Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS,
L3C (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html (listing the month and year that
each L3C statute was passed, the number of L3Cs formed in each jurisdiction, and the L3C
company names).
6. Cass Brewer, Hybrid Business Entities in 2014, SOCENTLAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://socentlaw.com/2014/01/hybrid-business-entities-in-2014/; Anne Field, North Carolina
(Jan.
11,
2014),
Officially
Abolishes
the
L3C,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially-abolishes-the-l3c/.
7. Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal
Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (stating that Bob Lang conceived of the L3C form in
2005).
8. Robert Lang, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/pub/robert-lang/b/b0/aa2 (last visited
Nov. 9, 2015).
9. Lang & Minnigh supra note 7, at 15–17; John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins,
Regulation of L3Cs for Social Entrepreneurship: A Prerequisite to Increase Utilization, 92 NEB.
L. REV. 259, 272–73 (2013) (explaining that L3C proponents intended for the L3C to attract PRIs
from foundations, but stating that L3C investments do not automatically qualify as PRIs and
noting that at least one senior IRS agent has encouraged caution when attempting to invest in a
L3C as a PRI). PRIs are investments that are not made for financial reasons, but to facilitate the
exempt purpose of a private foundation. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2009). In addition, the “IRS considers all
moneys paid out as PRIs to be ‘qualifying distributions,’ which means they count toward the
IRS’s requirement that private foundations spend five percent of their net worth in any given
year.” Id. at 356.
10. Pearce II & Hopkins, supra note 9, at 261–62 (noting that the L3C statutes were intended
to mirror the PRI requirements).
11. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(1) (2010). Other state L3C statutes largely
follow Vermont’s lead. Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for ProgramRelated Investments, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 11, 13 (noting that the Vermont L3C
statute is similar to the L3C statutes in other states).
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significant income or the appreciation property standing alone is not
conclusive evidence of a statutory violation. 12 The L3C proponents
believed that if the L3C statutes required of companies the same thing that
the PRI regulations require of investments, an L3C would become a safe
place for foundations to make PRIs, without need for costly written legal
opinions from counsel or advanced private letter rulings by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”). 13 To date, however, the IRS has not expressly
endorsed the L3C as an unassailable safe harbor for PRIs. 14 Lang promoted
a tranched investment structure for L3Cs where foundations would provide
high-risk, low-return capital, which would make it more likely that
traditional investors would obtain a market return.15
Lang and his supporters have touted the L3C as aiding private
foundations in the PRI process; a “for-profit with [a] nonprofit soul” that
serves both profit and social purpose; 16 a branding vehicle; and a way,
through his proposed tranched investment structure, to provide each set of
investors their desired social and financial returns. 17 Professors and
practitioners quickly launched significant criticism against the L3C. These
skeptics claimed, among other things, that the statutes did not significantly
protect or aid private foundations in the PRI process; LLCs could serve the
same purpose as the L3C under the current tax law; the statutes were
overhyped and the claims of L3C proponents were overly optimistic; the
skeletal L3C statute was insufficient to deal with the complexities
stemming from the conflicts between the “two masters” of profit and
purpose; and the proposed tranched investments were impractical and could
12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(2).
13. Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and
Mission Driven Organizations, 36 ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 251, 253–56 (2007)
(describing his view on how the L3C can cut costs for foundations looking to make a PRI); cf.
John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 125–26 (2010) (noting that L3Cs do not
have to attract PRIs and that there may be uses for the L3C form outside of the foundation and
PRI contexts).
14. See Jamie Hopkins, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: High-Risk Tax Fad or
Legitimate Social Investment Planning Opportunity?, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 42–
43, (2014) http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HOPKINS_2014_35.pdf (first
citing IRS, Proposed Guidelines, Examples of Program Related Investments, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,429
(proposed Apr. 19, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53), https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-9468;
then citing Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy
or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010)) (noting that the IRS has proposed rules with
examples of proper PRIs suggesting that L3Cs could be a proper recipient, but also noting that the
IRS guidance does not provide a complete safe harbor for L3Cs and sufficient caution is
recommended).
15. Lang & Minnigh, supra note 7, at 17–19 (explaining the proposed tranched L3C
investment structure).
16. Id. at 17.
17. See generally Lang, Jr., supra note 13; Lang & Minnigh supra note 7; Arthur Wood,
Transcript: New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35 VT. L. REV. 45
(2010).
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lead to private inurement that may jeopardize the investing foundations’ tax
exemptions. 18 A few commentators largely agreed with the criticisms, but
also suggested reforms for the L3C law. The suggested reforms for the
L3C law included the following: amend the proposed tranched model by
replacing traditional investors with social investors; require at least one taxexempt investor; add reporting and registration requirements for certain
L3Cs; require at least a partial asset lock for L3Cs engaged in mergers and
acquisitions activity; and provide free transferability and withdraw by any
tax-exempt member of an L3C. 19
Possibly in response to the academic and practitioner criticism, the
passing of the L3C statutes has been at a relative standstill, with the last
L3C statute passed in 2012. 20 From 2012 to present, over a dozen state
social enterprise statutes, of types other than the L3C, were passed.21 The
number of L3C statutes has actually decreased since 2012; as mentioned
above, effective January 1, 2014, North Carolina repealed its L3C statute.22
Currently, there are reported to be approximately 1200 L3Cs and most are
small, closely held entities. 23
B. Benefit Corporations and Benefit LLCs
In 2010, Maryland passed the first benefit corporation statute. 24
Currently, over two dozen states have passed benefit corporation statutes, a
few of which are “public benefit corporation” statutes, discussed below in a

18. Bishop, supra note 14, at 243–46 (claiming that the L3C does not protect foundations
making a PRI and challenging the proposed L3C tranche investment plan); J. William Callison &
Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not
Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L.
REV. 273, 274–75 (2010) (challenging the optimism of the L3C proponents); David S. Chernoff,
L3Cs: Less than Meets the Eye, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS, May/June 2010, at 3, 4–5 (dispelling six
myths about the L3C); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010)
(claiming that a number of “glowing characterizations [of the L3C] are each flatly wrong”).
19. See generally Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, Seven Ways to Strengthen and Improve the
L3C, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2011).
20. Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5. Rhode Island passed the most recent L3C
statute. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-76 (1999 & Supp. 2014) (effective July 1, 2012).
21. See infra Appendix A.
22. See Brewer, supra note 6.
23. A review of the L3C list compiled by interSector Partners, L3C reveals almost no
recognizable companies and a number of companies that are not even large enough to afford or
desire a website. Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5.
24. Act effective October 1, 2010, 2010 Md. Laws Ch. 97, § 1 (S.B. 690) (current version at
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2014)).
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separate Section. 25 B Lab, a non-profit organization, which has been
privately certifying companies as “certified B corporations” since June of
2007, has been a major force behind the passing of benefit corporation
statutes. 26 Many proponents of the benefit corporation form have authored
or contributed to a white paper entitled The Need and Rationale for the
Benefit Corporation (“Proponent White Paper”). 27 Major arguments made
in the Proponent White Paper and the responses by skeptics are summarized
in this Section.
The authors of the Proponent White Paper claim that the market
(including consumers, investors, and social entrepreneurs) is demanding a
society-focused, for-profit entity form like the benefit corporation.28
Skeptics note that relatively few people have taken advantage of the
existing social enterprise forms, such as benefit corporations. 29 Only
approximately 1000 benefit corporations were formed in the first four years
of the statute’s existence, suggesting the market demand may be less than
was claimed. 30 For comparison, Delaware is home to over one million
entities, and in 2007 an average of 430 LLCs were formed every weekday
in Delaware. 31 In 2014 alone, over 169,000 total entities were formed in
Delaware, so approximately 1000 benefit corporations (spread over many

25. State
by
State
Legislative
Status,
BENEFIT
CORP.
INFO.
CTR.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); see infra Part
I.D.
26. Our History, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/thenon-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (stating that the first full-time
work at B Lab commenced on July 5, 2006 and the first B Corps were certified on June 8, 2007).
27. William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the
Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, BENEFIT CORP. (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%20Corporation%20White%20Paper.p
df.
28. Id. at 2–6.
29. J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design, 26 REGENT
U. L. REV. 143, 165 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 623 (2011).
30. Kate Cooney, Justin Koushyar, Matthew Lee & J. Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporation
and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation_and_l3c_adoption_a_survey. Currently, there are
roughly 1400 “certified B corporations” in existence, but benefit corporations are not required to
be certified, and the certified B corporations, oddly, include partnerships, LLCs, and traditional
corporations, in addition to benefit corporations. Certified B Corporations, BCORPORATION.NET,
http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). During the publication process, the
number of benefit corporations has risen significantly though this new total number is still
insignificant in face of the total number of businesses in Delaware and elsewhere in the United
States. Appendix A.
31. Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility
and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 201 (2011) (discussing how formation of LLCs
significantly outpaced incorporations in Delaware).
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states) is a small drop in a big bucket. 32 Proponents of the benefit
corporation form counter by noting that the first statute was passed just a
few years ago, that awareness of the benefit corporation is still spreading,
and that the number of benefit corporations is growing. 33
The Proponent White Paper’s authors also argue that existing case law
hinders socially focused for-profit entities, citing iconic corporate law cases
like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 34 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 35
Revlon Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,36 and eBay Domestic
Holdings v. Newmark. 37 The benefit corporation movement has been
spurred, in part, by statements by the current Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, Leo Strine, including the statement that “as a matter of
corporate law, the object of the corporation is to produce profits for the
stockholders[;] . . . the social beliefs of the managers, no more than their
own financial interests, cannot be their end in managing the corporation.” 38
Also, former Delaware Chancellor William Chandler wrote in eBay v.
Newmark that “[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany
that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” 39
Some critical
commentators have noted that existing law already provides potential
solutions for social entrepreneurs, including (1) using the flexible, contractbased LLC form, (2) incorporating in one of the more than thirty states with
a constituency statute, and (3) incorporating in a state like Oregon, which

32. Jeff Mordock, Delaware Sets Record for New Businesses, DELAWAREONLINE (Jan. 6,
2015), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2015/01/06/delaware-sets-recordnew-businesses/21366135/ (noting that the roughly 169,000 new businesses formed in Delaware
in 2014 set a new record, breaking the 162,000 mark set in 2007).
33. See, e.g., Interview with William H. Clark, Jr., Corporate & Securities Partner at Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP and Drafter of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, in Seattle, WA at
Seattle Pacific University (Oct. 8, 2014); see also E-mail from William H. Clark, Jr., to J. Haskell
Murray, Assistant Professor at Belmont University (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:46 AM) (on file with
author) (confirming the conversation and agreeing with the statement attached to this footnote);
FAQ: General Questions, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Nov. 19, 2015)
(noting that the first benefit corporation law was passed in 2010 and citing “Method, Plum
Organics, King Arthur Flour, Patagonia, Solberg Manufacturing, and Rasmussen Colleges” as
some well-known benefit corporations).
34. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
35. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 956 (Del. 1985).
36. Revlon Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
37. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Clark &
Vranka, supra note 27, at 7–13.
38. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151 (2012).
39. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc,. 16 A.3d at 34. Professor Lyman Johnson has questioned
the eBay decision and noted the lack of citation to authority for the court’s statement about the
need to focus on shareholder profits. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate
Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 274–75 (2013).
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expressly allows corporations to adopt a social or environmental purpose. 40
Certain academics have argued that social entrepreneurs could avoid the
holdings of the cases cited in the Proponent White Paper by incorporating
in more stakeholder-friendly states, and even in the states where the cited
cases control the business judgment rule provides significant protection for
social entrepreneurs. 41 Other commentators contend that even if benefit
corporations are not technically needed, this new entity form might serve as
a useful signaling device. 42
The centerpiece of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation is its
purpose clause, which states that each benefit corporation must pursue a
“general public benefit,” defined as “[a] material positive impact on society
and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”43 In
previous work, this author has claimed that the “general public benefit”
concept is too vague, provides insufficient guidance to directors when they
face zero-sum games, and should be supplemented to require the
prioritization of the interests, or at least the identification of the benefit
corporation’s primary interest. 44 Other commentators have suggested that
the “general public benefit” mandate is too broad, and statutes should be
made flexible enough to allow social entrepreneurs to focus on one or more
narrow social or environmental issues without being forced to consider all
stakeholders. 45
Proponents of the benefit corporation form claim that the benefit
corporation law provides a higher level of accountability and transparency
40. Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable
Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 685–86 (2012) (noting
that the LLC entity form can be used for social enterprise purposes); J. Haskell Murray, Choose
Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2012) (discussing the legal solutions, outside of social enterprise law, for
social entrepreneurs); cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1036 (2013) (noting, with approval, that some critics of social
enterprise have argued that the existing corporate law is sufficient for social entrepreneurs, but
stating that a purpose of the benefit corporation law is not just to allow socially focused behavior,
but to mandate socially focused behavior).
41. Johnson, supra note 39, at 273–78; Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1008 n.3; Murray,
supra note 40, at 16–17.
42. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 505–07 (2013); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social
Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (2015).
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§§ 102,
201(a)
(2014),
43. MODEL
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf.
44. Murray, supra note 40, at 5.
45. J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 98–104 (2012) (calling the inflexibility of the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation the “Illiberalism Problem”); Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1014–15 (claiming the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation is overly rigid because it would not allow an entity to
focus on only one set of stakeholders).
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than traditional corporate law. 46 Proponents argue that accountability is
increased by statutory language requiring directors to consider the interests
of various corporate stakeholders, mandating a corporate purpose to benefit
society and the environment, and providing benefit enforcement
proceedings for resolution of complaints related to alleged violations of the
benefit corporation statute. 47 Transparency is increased, proponents argue,
by the benefit corporation statutes requiring an annual benefit report and
requiring the measurement of general public benefit against a
“comprehensive, credible, independent and transparent” 48 third-party
standard. 49
Various authors have called into question the alleged strength of these
so-called accountability and transparency measures in the benefit
corporation law. 50 For example, some commentators have noted that only
shareholders, and not the other stakeholders, have standing to bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding. 51 Shareholders may not have significant
incentives to keep directors accountable to other stakeholders, especially
when doing so reduces the shareholders’ financial returns. 52 Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has criticized benefit corporation
law, writing that “[benefit corporations exist in] a fictional land where you
can take other people’s money, use it as you wish, and ignore the best
interests of those with the only right to vote.” 53 Some academic articles
have suggested statutory amendments to provide more serious
accountability, including imposing a charitable giving floor, adding a
partial-asset lock, instituting stakeholder standing, and regulating the thirdparty standard providers that currently vary wildly in quality. 54 At least one
author has noted that benefit enforcement proceedings may be used by
46. Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 15–21.
47. Id.
48. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining
the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 846 (2012).
49. Id. at 842–50 (paying particular attention to the importance of a third-party standard);
Clark & Vranka, supra note 27. Bill Clark and Lizzie Babson have done legal work for the
primary third-party standard provider, B Lab.
50. Callison, supra note 45, at 90–92, 109–111 (discussing the influence of B Lab in passing
what he considers unwise legislation and noting the possible use of benefit corporations to
greenwash given that the area is largely unregulated); see also David Groshoff,
Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation’s Feel-Good Governance
Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 262 (2013) (noting the weakness of the benefit corporation’s
primary enforcement mechanism—the benefit enforcement proceeding).
51. Murray, supra note 40, at 16–17; Reiser, supra note 29, at 613–14.
52. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”? 4 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 235, 250–52 (2014) (questioning whether a shareholder will be motivated to protect
other stakeholders).
53. Strine, Jr., supra note 38, at 150.
54. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation
Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 363 (2014); Murray, supra note 40, at 22; Murray, supra note
42, at 507–11.
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shareholders to “greenmail” benefit corporations into buying off those
particular shareholders, possibly to the detriment of the corporation, its
mission, and the other stakeholders. 55 On the transparency front, authors
have noted that the statutory requirements involving benefit reports are
extremely vague, susceptible to white- and green-washing, and generally
lack an express enforcement mechanism for punishing benefit corporations
that do not provide the reports. 56 A few commentators have suggested that
financial tools, and the private market in general, may be more effective
than statutes in providing accountability and transparency. 57
Currently, Maryland and Oregon provide for the formation of benefit
LLCs. 58 The existing benefit LLC statutes are nearly identical to the
benefit corporation statutes, but the benefit LLC law relies on the state LLC
statute, instead of the state corporation statute, to fill in the gaps. 59 Most
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes, including B Lab, claim that
they are not encouraging the passage of benefit LLC legislation at this time
because they believe the traditional LLC law to be flexible enough to
address the needs of social entrepreneurs who are not interested in the
corporate form. 60 Other proponents, however, believe that the benefit LLC
55. See Callison, supra note 45, at 109–11 (arguing that benefit enforcement proceedings
may be used improperly by plaintiffs simply looking to extract funds from benefit corporations or
for “adherence to their idiosyncratic conception of the good”). The term “greenmail” is often
used in the hostile takeover situation when a corporation pays “a firm or individual in exchange
for an agreement not to proceed with a tender offer,” but “greenmail” can also be used more
generally, as Callison uses the term, to refer to payments for not proceeding with other actions
related to the corporation. Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of
Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 14 n.1 (1985); see also Callison, supra note 45, at 109–
11.
56. Callison, supra note 45, at 109–10; Murray, supra note 40, at 42–43. Greenwashing can
be defined as making false or exaggerated claims about the environmental friendliness of a
product, company, or industry. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 133–34
(2009). Greenwashing, however, does not have one agreed upon definition. Miriam A. Cherry,
The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L. J. 281, 295 (2014). Greenwashing is “when a company tries to portray itself as more
environmentally minded than it actually is.” David Gelles, Social Responsibility That Rubs Right
Off, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/business/energyenvironment/social-responsibility-that-rubs-right-off.html?_r=0. “[A]s a conceptual matter, a
whitewash has three essential components: an underlying defect, an attempt to conceal the defect
by diverting attention, and a failure to fix the underlying defect.” Lesley Wexler, Extralegal
Whitewashes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 825 (2013).
57. Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid
Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495 (2013); see also Murray, supra
note 40, at 45–46.
58. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4a-1201–1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 60.750-60.770 (2014).
59. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4a-1201–1208; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750–
60.770.
60. See Murray, supra note 40, at 23 n.101 (citing Telephone Interview with William H.
Clark, Jr., Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath and primary draftsperson for the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation (Jan. 23, 2012)).
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is a useful form because many small businesses prefer the LLC framework,
while also desiring the branding and signaling provided by a “benefit”
entity form. 61
C. Social Purpose Corporations
Two states, California and Washington, have passed more flexible
social enterprise statutes that resist some of the mandatory provisions of the
benefit corporation statutes, such as the required “general public benefit
purpose.” 62 Unlike the Model-based benefit corporation statutes, these
social purpose corporations (“SPC”) statutes do not require a general public
benefit purpose but do require adoption of one or more specific purposes. 63
While the Model-based benefit corporation statutes require pursuit of a
“general public purpose” and require benefit corporation directors to
consider the interests of all stakeholders, the SPC statutes allow focus on a
narrower group of stakeholders. 64
The SPC statutes also expressly provide for dissenters’ rights, the
payment of fair value for the shares of shareholders who object to
conversion to an SPC from a more traditional entity form. 65 Dissenters’
rights have been included in a few benefit corporation statutes, including
California’s, but are not included in the statutes that follow the Model
Benefit Corporation Legislation.66 Bill Clark, the primary drafter of the
benefit corporation legislation, has argued that dissenters’ rights might
harm cash-poor corporations that wish to convert, but do not have the
resources to pay the shareholders who do not want to make the change to a
social enterprise form. 67

61. Telephone Interview with James Woulfe, Public Policy and Impact Investing Specialist
at the Social Enterprise Trust (Jan. 29, 2015). Mr. Woulfe was involved in the Connecticut
benefit corporation efforts and is considering supporting the passage of benefit LLC legislation in
Connecticut. Id.
62. Rob R. Carlson & Lisa M. Tran, California Creates Two New Types of Corporations:
Understanding the Benefit Corporation and Flexible Purpose Corporation, STAY CURRENT: A
CLIENT
ALERT
FROM
PAUL
HASTINGS
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/2137.pdf. See generally What Are SPCs?,
SOCIAL PURPOSE CORP., http://www.spcwa.com/what-are-spcs/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
63. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517, 2600–2605, 2700–2702, 2800, 2900, 3000–3002,
3100, 3200–3203, 3300–3306, 3400–3401, 3500–3503 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 23B.25.005–150 (West 2013).
64. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3305 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.020–030
(West 2013).
65. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.120 (West
2013); Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. &
POL’Y REV. 347, 357 (2013).
66. J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished chart), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556.
67. Clark & Vranka, supra note 27.
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Supporters of benefit corporation statutes have stated that the SPC
statutes are too weak to support the dual mission of social entrepreneurs. 68
Benefit corporation proponents worry that SPCs might harm society by
focusing on a narrow set of interests, for example, caring for the
environment, while treating their employees poorly. 69 Critics of the benefit
corporation framework respond that the benefit corporation statute has
overpromised, will suffocate companies with its mandatory provisions, and
has not provided the means to live up to its bold claims of achieving both
profit and broad purpose. 70
D. Public Benefit Corporations
In 2013, Delaware, the leader in U.S. corporate law, entered the social
enterprise law scene with its own statutory innovation: the public benefit
corporation (“PBC”). 71 B Lab places Delaware’s PBC statute under the
benefit corporation umbrella, but the Delaware statute differs from the
Model statute in a number of ways. 72 Colorado and Minnesota have
already adopted large parts of Delaware’s PBC statute, and other states are
considering using portions of, or the entirety of, Delaware’s framework. 73
The Delaware statute is more permissive than the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation in most areas, but has more mandatory provisions
in the corporate purpose area than the SPC statutes. 74 In language broader
than that in the SPC statutes, a Delaware PBC “is a for-profit
corporation . . . intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and
68. See, e.g., Derek Ridgway, Flexible Purpose Corporation vs. Benefit Corporation,
HANSONBRIDGETT (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/201209-flexible-purpose.aspx (calling the FPC “watered down” and opining that the FPC “will
undoubtedly become more susceptible to ‘greenwashing,’ which may in turn erode the underlying
purpose and benefits of the entity over time”); Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at app. C, 4–9
(stating that the FPC law lacks the accountability and transparency of the benefit corporation law).
69. Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 8.
70. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 45, at 113–14; Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1036–37.
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also Murray, supra note
54, at 350–64 (providing a brief history of the public benefit corporation in Delaware and
comparing the Delaware legislation to the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation).
72. Murray, supra note 54, at 350 (noting the process, B Lab’s involvement, and the opinion
of certain B Lab employees regarding the passage of the public benefit corporation law in
Delaware); Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, DELAWARE.GOV
(July 17, 2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-benefitcorporation-legislation/.
73. See generally Callison, supra note 29; Deborah J. Walker, Please Welcome the
Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation, U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408241.
74. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015), with MODEL
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
(2014),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; see also
Murray, supra note 54, at 369–70 (comparing major provisions of the Delaware Public Benefit
Corporation Law with the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation).
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to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.” 75 The Delaware PBC
statute also requires PBCs to choose a specific purpose and to “manage or
direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner
that balances [1] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, [2] the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and [3]
the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.” 76 The Delaware law only requires a benefit report every
two years, instead of the annual requirement under the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation, and the Delaware PBC law does not require the
report to be publicly posted. 77 Further, the Delaware law allows, but does
not require, a Benefit Director or use of a third-party standard. In short,
Delaware’s PBC law mostly pushes the Model’s benefit corporation
framework toward increased private ordering. 78
The Colorado statute largely followed the Delaware PBC law, but
Colorado has reporting requirements that more closely follow the Model. 79
The Corporate Laws Drafting Committee under the Colorado Bar
Association (“CBA”) first attempted to pass a law that would allow firms to
choose a general public benefit, a specific public benefit, or both. 80 The
CBA then attempted to pass a law that mirrored Delaware in all areas. 81
The CBA reportedly faced opposition from B Lab and its supporters on
both attempts; eventually Colorado passed a compromise PBC law that
followed Delaware in most areas except for the reporting requirements. 82
The Minnesota PBC law, effective January 1, 2015, allows the formation of
two types of entities: general benefit corporations and specific benefit
corporations. 83 The general benefit corporation is akin to the Model-type
benefit corporation and the specific benefit corporation is similar to the
SPC. 84
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2011 & Supp. 2015).
76. Id. § 365(a) (emphasis added); see also Murray, supra note 54, at 355 n.64 (discussing
the debate on the choice to use the word “balance” in the Delaware PBC law and the word
“consider” in the Model Benefit Corporation legislation in relation to the director duties toward
stakeholder interests).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2011 & Supp. 2015).
78. Murray, supra note 54, at 351–54. Private ordering has been defined as “self-regulation
voluntarily undertaken by private parties.” Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The
Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376
(2005).
79. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in
LAW.,
Jan.
2014,
at
40,
Colorado,
COLO.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2266654 (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
80. Callison, supra note 29, at 159–60.
81. Id. at 163.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501–509 (West 2006 Supp. 2014); Callison, supra
note 29, at 159–64.
83. Walker, supra note 73, at 2, 17.
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A (West 2011 & Supp. 2015).
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The PBC laws are quite recent, so relatively little legal scholarship has
been published on this specific entity type as of the publication of this
Article. The academic articles that have been written have largely
considered the PBC form to be an improvement on most of the existing
social enterprise laws. 85 The same articles, however, have noted various
issues with the PBC laws, including continued lack of clarity for directors
and the seeming lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. 86
II. ITERATIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW
As Part I demonstrates, states have passed a variety of social enterprise
statutes and social enterprise law has drawn out conflicting views in the
literature. Social enterprise law has evolved over time, sometimes due to
the passage of a statute that creates a new entity type and sometimes due to
the passage of a statute that simply modifies an existing entity type. As
described in more detail in this Part, social enterprise statutes have evolved
significantly over time. The L3C statutes are very thin and have few
requirements, but they do clearly state that the common good must be the
primary purpose of the L3C. 87 The benefit corporation statutes, along with
the FPC, SPC, and PBC statutes, are less clear on the priorities of the
entities than the L3C, but add significant additional detail in other areas. 88
The iterations and innovations involving the social enterprise forms,
organized by legal issue, are discussed below.89
A. Entity Purpose
Defining entity purpose has been at the heart of many of the social
enterprise statutes. 90 For L3C statutes, the law is clear that “charitable or
educational purposes” must dominate the “production of income.” 91
Subsequent social enterprise statutes have defined entity purpose, but most
have not clearly explained how the interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders should be prioritized. For example, the Model Benefit
85. See generally Frederick H. Alexander, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Frank R. Martin, &
Norman M. Monhait, M&A Under Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A
Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255 (2014); Callison, supra note 29; Murray, supra
note 54; Strine, supra note 52.
86. See supra note 85.
87. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010).
88. Murray, supra note 66.
89. See infra Part II.A–F.
90. See Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 15 (stating that defining corporate purpose to
“create a material positive impact on society and the environment” is one of three major
provisions in the benefit corporation statutes); see also Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social
Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 168 (2010)
(noting the important social purpose provisions in the L3C statutes).
91. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4162 (2010).
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Corporation Legislation and most states that follow the Model require a
“general public benefit purpose.” 92 Shareholders are included among the
stakeholders that directors of benefit corporations must consider, but The
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation does not provide prioritization
among stakeholders. 93 The SPC statutes address what Bill Callison calls
the “illiberalism problem” created by the broad, mandatory “general public
[benefit] purpose,” by providing more flexibility in the definition of entity
purpose. 94 The SPC statutes allow an entity’s focus to be on one or more
specific stakeholders. 95 The PBC statutes, initially championed by
Delaware, stake out middle ground by requiring both a specific public
benefit purpose and a more general public purpose.96 The SPC and PBC
statutes, however, do not clearly address the issue of prioritization among
shareholders and other stakeholders. 97
B. Third-Party Standards and Social Reporting
L3C statutes do not require the use of a third-party standard in
measuring the social impact of an entity. 98 Benefit corporation statutes,
most of which were passed after the L3C statutes, do require use of a thirdparty standard, while Delaware’s PBC statute expressly allows, but does not
require, a third-party standard. 99 Colorado’s PBC statute follows the Model
in requiring a third-party standard, while the SPC statutes do not require
entities to use a third-party standard to measure social impact. 100
The L3C statutes do not expressly require any social reporting. 101 The
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation and most state benefit corporation
statutes require annual benefit reports that must be posted on a public
portion of the firm’s website. 102 A few of the benefit corporation statutes,
92. MODEL
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§
201(a)
(2014),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf.
93. See id. § 301.
94. Callison, supra note 29, at 151–52 (arguing that the “general public purpose” concept is
overly restrictive and that different corporate actors are likely to have different understandings of
what is good for society).
95. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3305 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.020–030
(West 2013).
96. See DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8, §§ 362, 365 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-101-503, 506 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
97. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-503, 506 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); see also
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2014).
98. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010).
99. Murray, supra note 66; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social
Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 690–91 (2013) (claiming that the third-party standard
requirement is a cornerstone requirement of the benefit corporation legislation).
100. Murray, supra note 66.
101. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001–3023 (2010) (repeal effective July 1, 2016).
102. Murray, supra note 66. Forthcoming research by the author will show, however, that
early benefit corporations have had miserably low compliance rates (under ten percent) with
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namely Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey, create express penalties for failing to provide benefit reports. 103
For example, in New Jersey, if an annual benefit report is not filed for two
years, then that benefit corporation will lose its benefit corporation status. 104
Most of the state benefit corporation statutes, however, have no express
enforcement mechanism related to social reporting. 105 The California SPC
statute requires both annual and special reports.106 The Delaware PBC
statute requires only biennial reports and the report only has to be shared
with shareholders and not the general public, unless the PBC decides to
require public disclosure.107 A minority of states, including Arizona,
Arkansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Utah, require filing the annual
benefit corporation report with the state. 108 While many of these states that
require filing are also the states that have enforcement mechanisms for
failing to file a report, some states like Utah, require filing of the benefit
report with the secretary of state, but do not expressly mention a
consequence for failing to file.109 Even worse, many of the states neither
require filing of the benefit report with the state nor do they have any
effective enforcement mechanism for failing to produce the report on the
firm’s website. 110

regard to the social reporting requirements. See generally, J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on
VA.
L.
REV.
25
(forthcoming
2016),
Benefit
Reports,
118
W.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2682709.
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.613 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156E, § 7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.030(3) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-11(d)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13 (LexisNexis
2014).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(2).
105. Murray, supra note 66.
106. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2014); see also Reiser & Dean, supra note 57, at
72–74 (discussing the extensive reporting requirements of the FPC statute).
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also Murray, supra note 54, at
371 (showing the differences between the Delaware PBC law and the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation).
108. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2442 (2013 & Supp. 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-401
(2001 & Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 16 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-414 (2012 & Supp.
2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293- C:13 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West
2003 & Supp. 2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3331 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-500 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10b-402 (LexisNexis 2014).
109. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10b-402.
110. Murray, supra note 66. This failure to require filing of the benefit report and the failure
to provide enforcement mechanisms may be oversight or may reflect the reality that many states
have extremely limited resources and are not willing to invest significantly in benefit corporations
at this early stage.
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C. Dissenters’ Rights
Neither the L3C statutes nor the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation address dissenters’ rights for shareholders who oppose the
transition to or from social enterprise status. 111 The authors of the
Proponent White Paper argue that dissenters’ rights should not be included
in social enterprise laws because dissenters’ rights are usually coupled with
a liquidity event and changing entity types would not provide the liquidity
needed to pay dissenters. 112 This reasoning is not particularly persuasive
because if converting to a benefit corporation was a prudent strategy, new
shareholders could be found to buy out any dissenters.
A number of states have departed from the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation and expressly provided for dissenters’ rights. California’s
benefit corporation and SPC statutes were the first to expressly address and
require dissenters’ rights. 113
Florida, Minnesota, and Washington
followed. 114 Allowing dissenters’ rights, but only when adopting benefit
corporation status, not when terminating benefit corporation status, are the
states of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
South Carolina. 115
Going in a different direction, Virginia addresses the issue of a
potentially unwanted entity conversion by requiring one hundred percent
shareholder approval for adoption of benefit corporation status, instead of
the typical two-thirds shareholder vote. 116 No known claims for dissenters’
rights in the benefit corporation context currently exist. The mere existence
of dissenters’ rights in some states, however, may lead to better shareholder
protection because of the significant financial liability that could be
triggered if firms convert to (or in some states “from”) a social enterprise
entity form in the face of significant shareholder opposition. While
dissenters’ rights may protect shareholders who do not want such a change
in firm entity type, dissenters’ rights may also open the door to costly
claims from private company shareholders who are simply looking for
liquidity.

111. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010); Murray, supra note
66.
112. Clark & Vranka, supra note 27.
113. See Murray, supra note 66.
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.604-605 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 304A.103 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.120 (West 2013) .
115. See Murray, supra note 66.
116. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-785–786 (2011). Delaware requires ninety percent shareholder
approval for a traditional corporation to convert to a public benefit corporation. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 363 (2014).
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D. Naming and Notification
One of the often-cited benefits of social enterprise legislation is the
branding or signaling aspect, but this benefit may be difficult to capture if a
large percentage of the public are not aware of the company’s social
enterprise entity selection. 117 From a legal standpoint, the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation and most benefit corporation state statutes require
acknowledgment that the firm is a benefit corporation in the articles of
incorporation, but have largely not required notification of entity type in the
formal name. 118 L3C statutes require that the firm name include the
abbreviation L3C. 119 California (SPC), Colorado (PBC), Delaware (PBC),
Louisiana (BC), Minnesota (PBC), and Washington (SPC) also require
designation of the entity type in the firm name. 120 Statutes without a
naming requirement have made it difficult on researchers, and presumably
interested consumers and government officials, to track these social
enterprises. According to Erik Trojian, B Lab’s Director of Policy, the
naming requirement was not included in the Model because of the
administrative costs that existing firms would have to shoulder to amend
various documents related to their name. 121 Of course, B Lab’s motivation
is to make adoption of these forms as easy as possible; state legislatures,
however, may wish to include a naming requirement, as a number of states
have, to improve transparency and traceability of these social enterprises. 122
Some states, including California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nevada, and New York, have required notification of the entity
type on stock certificates.123
Social enterprise legal entity forms are still not well known in many
quarters. 124 The names of the social enterprise entity forms often include
words like “benefit,” “social,” or “sustainable,” therefore requiring that the
entity type be included in the company’s name could aid social enterprises
117. Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1034–35 (discussing the branding challenges that may
occur if the benefit corporation statutes vary significantly from state to state); Murray, supra note
54, at 357–58; Yockey, supra note 42, at 812–13.
118. Callison, supra note 45, at 93 (“There are no name requirements, either in the positive
sense, where benefit corporations must designate themselves as such, or in the negative sense,
where corporations that are not benefit corporations cannot use a name implying benefit
corporation status.”); Murray, supra note 54, at 357–58 (discussing some of the difficulties arising
from the absence of a naming requirement in the benefit corporation statutes); Murray, supra note
66.
119. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4005(a)(2) (2010).
120. Murray, supra note 66.
121. Telephone Interview with Erik Trojian, Dir. of Policy, B Lab (Aug. 15, 2013).
122. Id. (discussing the difficulties some companies might have in switching to the benefit
corporation form if those companies were required to change their legal name).
123. Murray, supra note 66.
124. Reiser, supra note 29, at 622–24 (claiming that the benefit corporation brand is not yet
well known in the marketplace).
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in signaling to managers, employees, customers, and governments the
social mission of the firms. 125 As Professor Joseph Yockey has argued,
social enterprise laws may serve as focal points and can “direct[] social
enterprises toward a desired starting point for structuring their behavior.”126
Even if the social enterprises were well known, Professor Usha Rodrigues
wonders if social enterprises can send a strong signal to stakeholders given
their dual focus on public purpose and profit. 127
The names chosen for the hybrid forms—low-profit limited liability
company, flexible purpose corporation, social purpose corporation, benefit
corporation, and public benefit corporation—may play a role in entity-norm
creation and signaling. 128 The weakest names, from a social perspective,
are “low-profit limited liability company” and “flexible purpose
corporation.” Recently, each of those forms has attracted less attention,
perhaps at least partially owing to the entity names, which do not clearly
state the social purpose of the hybrid form. The flexible purpose
corporation name has been abandoned altogether.129 In contrast, the names
“social purpose corporation,” “benefit corporation,” and “public benefit
corporation” connote a focus on the society at large. 130 The public does not
generally take the time to dive into the nuances of corporate law, therefore,
the name of the entity form may be important in the initial shaping of the

125. Murray, supra note 54, at 505–06; Yockey, supra note 42, at 812 (noting the influence
entity choice may have on the culture of social enterprises); cf. Robert C. Illig, Oregon’s
Experiment with Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, 25 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 189, 202 (2010) (“Signaling is a dangerous sport, as one loses control of the signal as soon
as it is commenced, and it is frequently received either too loudly or not at all. As a result, signals
are subject to the twin risks of misinterpretation and misdelivery.”).
126. Yockey, supra note 42, at 808.
127. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1318–19 (2011).
128. Stronger signals might be sent through more than “mere talk” by states. For example, tax
incentives might prove to be a strong signal because in that case states will have made a financial
sacrifice, at least in the short run, unlike simply passing a social enterprise statute, which requires
almost no financial support from the state. See Illig, supra note 125, at 194 (arguing that Oregon
could send a strong signal to green businesses by “eliminat[ing] the state income tax on any
profits an organization earns from selling green technologies”); id. at 202; Murray, supra note 42.
129. Alicia Plerhoples, Flexible Purpose Corporations Change Their Name,
SOCENTLAW.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/10/flexible-purpose-corporationschange-their-name/.
130. The positive nature of these names may give rise to reasonable calls for a state
requirement for socially beneficial activity. See Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession
Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 333 (2014) (“Under concession theory, the state retains significant
presumptive authority to regulate the corporate entity in exchange for granting this bundle of
rights to incorporators.” (citing Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
183, 208 (2004))). But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)
(noting that a concession theory, the theory that “corporations, as creatures of the State, have only
those rights granted them by the State” was an “extreme position” with regard to traditional
corporations). Professor Padfield argues that he is only using “‘concession theory’ to denote a
theory of the corporation that gives deference to government regulation, as opposed to removing
all limits on the state’s right to regulate corporations.” Padfield, supra, at 333.

2016]

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET

561

public’s view of the entity. 131 Despite the signals sent by the name of the
forms, the profit-making of these hybrid forms may taint the social identity
if stronger private or public regulation is not put in place to guard against
rent-seeking by profit-focused actors. 132 In fact, the society-focused name
might even prove to be a detriment when scandals involving those firms are
brought to light and the public lashes out against the hypocrisy.
E. Legacy Preservation Provisions
Connecticut cut a new path with its legacy preservation provisions. 133
The legacy preservation provision is an interesting new statutory addition
that allows benefit corporations in Connecticut the option to “lock in” their
social mission after a twenty-four-month waiting period and unanimous
shareholder approval. 134 A Connecticut benefit corporation with an adopted
legacy provision that chooses to merge may only merge with a similar
benefit corporation with a legacy provision. 135 A disposition of assets of a
Connecticut benefit corporation with an adopted legacy preservation
provision may only be made to a charitable organization or a benefit
corporation with a similar legacy preservation provision. 136
This legacy provision may give some confidence to impact investors
who are looking for assurances that their money will be used for social
purposes. The provision may prevent managers of benefit corporations
from “selling out” when the mission fades or the potential profits from a
sale increase. The legacy provision, however, does not ensure that a benefit
corporation will do any social good, nor does it prevent managers of benefit
corporations from rent-seeking through excessive salaries and personal
benefits. Finally, the legacy provision may be overly restricted, as the
greatest social good may be achieved by selling the company for a high
price to a traditional corporation and allowing the benefit corporation’s

131. See Illig, supra note 125, at 193 (noting the public’s lack of familiarity with corporate
law).
132. See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM
THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 14–31 (2010) (arguing that social businesses
should be sustainable, but should not be run with shareholders seeking profits because the
conflicts are too strong).
133. James Woulfe, Woulfe on Connecticut Benefit Corporation Law, BUS. L. PROF BLOG
(July 18, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/woulfe-on-connecticutbenefit-corporation-law.html. The Connecticut benefit corporation statute became effective on
October 1, 2014. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 25.
134. CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1355 (2005 & Supp. 2015). The purpose of this waiting
period is not clear, but it may lead to fewer benefit corporations adopting this provision because it
may simply vanish from the minds of the managers after the benefit corporation is formed. The
statute is not clear regarding whether managers could adopt the provision when the benefit
corporation is formed, to be effective twenty-four months from formation.
135. Id. § 33-1356(c).
136. Id. § 33-1356(d).
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shareholders to give to society in their own ways through the proceeds.137
A better solution to mission drift may be found in a mandatory partial asset
lock, a minimum charitable contribution rule, or the use of financial
instruments that encourage a social focus.138 These solutions are not as
highly restrictive, serve a signaling purpose, and provide a likely social
benefit. 139
F. Relatively Stagnant Areas
Some areas of social enterprise law have remained relatively stagnant.
For example, most social enterprise laws that have addressed the area have
provided significant protection to managers. 140 Originally, the Model
Benefit Corporation Legislation did not allow any monetary liability for the
directors and officers of benefit corporations for “failure of the benefit
corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or specific public
benefit.” 141 Later versions of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation
allowed benefit corporations to opt into monetary liability for such a failure
to pursue or create public benefit.142 The Delaware PBC protects directors,
as long as their conduct “is both informed and disinterested and not such
that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.” 143
No social enterprise laws to date have provided automatic standing to
sue to external stakeholders despite the mandate in the statutes to
“consider” or “balance” external stakeholder interests. 144 In addition, no
state, other than Connecticut, has done much in the way of locking in a
mission or providing for serious consequences if the mission is aborted.145
137. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
TIMES
MAG.
(Sept.
13,
1970),
N.Y.
www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html
(arguing
that businesses should focus on increasing its profits, while staying within “the rules of the game,”
and leave “social responsibility” to individuals).
138. See generally Murray, supra note 40; Reiser & Dean, supra note 57.
139. While no proposed solution is likely to be without some flaws, a minimum charitable
contribution (in time or money) would place those contributions into a charitable regime that is
much more heavily regulated than the for-profit market.
140. Murray, supra note 66.
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§ 301(c)(2)
(2014),
141. MODEL
http://benefitcorp.org/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; Murray,
supra note 40, at 22 n.98.
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§
301(c)(2),
142. MODEL
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; Murray,
supra note 40, at 22 n.98. There are no indications that any benefit corporations have yet to take
advantage of the opportunity to opt into allowing the possibility of monetary liability for directors
or officers who fail to pursue or create public benefit.
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); Delaware Public Benefit
Corporations: FAQs (on file with author).
144. Murray, supra note 66.
145. Murray, supra note 66; Woulfe, supra note 133; Benefit Corporations Have Arrived in
Connecticut, MURTHA CULLINA LLP (June 2014), http://www.murthalaw.com/news_alerts/1404-
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Even Connecticut’s legacy protection provisions are optional.146 Most
states allow the benefit corporations to drop their status with a two-thirds
shareholder vote. Since the passage of the first statute, the penalty for L3Cs
violating the statute has simply been conversion to an LLC; the L3C
statutes provide neither express penalties in addition to the conversion nor
any statutory remedy to the L3C members who, after conversion, only hold
an interest in an LLC.147
Finally, the general public benefit purpose language and the need of a
third-party standard appear to be two items that B Lab clings to in their
promoting of the benefit corporation law.148 Delaware was able to alter the
general public purpose language and was able to make the third-party
standard optional. 149 Reportedly, B Lab’s response to other states that try
similar manipulations, especially in regard to the third-party standard
requirement, is to tell those states, “[you are] not Delaware.”150
Parts I and II have described what has come into being and what has
changed in social enterprise law. Parts III and IV will attempt to describe
why the evolution of social enterprise law occurred and “how” states may
proceed in the future.
III. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION OR JURISDICTIONAL POSITIONING
A. Race to the Bottom, Race to the Top, or Neither?
Jurisdictional competition for corporation charters has been heavily
analyzed and hotly debated in the academic legal literature.151 In 1974,
William Cary, then a law professor at Columbia University, wrote a
seminal article in the Yale Law Journal where he argued that Delaware
corporate law was leading a “race for the bottom.” 152 In basic terms, the
race to the bottom theory posits that states competing for charters have
enacted management-friendly enabling statutes and “have watered the
rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management down to a thin gruel.” 153
may—-benefit-corporations-arrived-connecticut (noting the uniqueness of Connecticut’s legacy
provisions in its benefit corporation statute).
146. CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1355 (2005 & Supp. 2015).
147. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4163(a) (2010) (“A limited liability company that elects to be
an L3C and subsequently fails to satisfy any one of the requirements set forth in section 4162 of
this title shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but by continuing to
meet all the other requirements of this chapter, continues to exist as a limited liability company.”).
148. Telephone Interview with Erik Trojian, Dir. of Policy, B Lab (Aug. 15, 2013).
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a), 366 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015).
150. Callison, supra note 29, at 163.
151. See generally Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed.) (forthcoming 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514650.
152. Cary, supra note 3.
153. Id. at 666.
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Professor Cary’s seminal article has been cited over 1000 times and a
popular legal academic blog even bears the title “The Race to the
Bottom.” 154 Additional research has sprouted to support and add to Cary’s
claims. 155
Others, including Judge Ralph Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, have countered that Delaware has led a “race for the
top.” 156 Proponents of the “race to the top” theory argue that investors will
prefer firms that do not excessively favor management and that competition
for charters creates incentives to construct the optimal corporate code.
Over time, the choice regarding where to incorporate has essentially boiled
down to two potential states: Delaware and the home state of the firm. 157
As explained by Professor Daines, “Federalism has thus resulted in a series
of local markets with one national producer, rather than a nationwide ‘race
to the top/bottom.’” 158
Professor Romano mentioned “Delaware’s
reputation for responsiveness to corporate concerns” 159 and “comprehensive
body of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, and administrative
expertise” as reasons for Delaware’s preeminence.160 Some commentators
claim this “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate is now at a
stalemate. 161

154. Westlaw Keycite of William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
L.J.
663
(1974);
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG,
Delaware,
83
YALE
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
155. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate
Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 137, 162 (2006); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1775 (2002); Bebchuk, supra note 2; Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation
Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991, 993–94 (1976); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary
Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883, 885–87 (1976).
156. See generally ROMANO, supra note 1; Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527–31 (2001); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Judge Ralph
Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
127 (1982); cf. Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (“I am far more confident that Professor Cary’s argument
about the race to the bottom is wrong than I am that my argument that Delaware is leading the
race to the top is right.”).
157. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1559
(2002).
158. Id.; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 394–402 (2003) (discussing the existence of “home-state
advantage” in the market for corporate law).
159. ROMANO, supra note 1, at 38.
160. Id. at 39.
161. See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L.
Rev. 1049, 1059 (2015); Roe supra note 4, at 634. But see Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 842 (1995) (claiming that there
is “broad consensus” in favor of some form of the “race to the top” theory).
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More recent scholarship on jurisdictional competition has suggested
that there is no longer vigorous competition between states for corporate
charters, though perhaps there had been such competition in the past before
Delaware became so dominant. 162 These commentators argue that
Delaware’s main competition in the corporate law arena now comes from
the federal government, rather than from other states, and have posited that
federal law, not state law through state competition, has accounted for most
changes in the amount of shareholder protection over the last eighty
years. 163 Professor Romano, however, has argued that Delaware publicly
expresses more concern about state competition than federal competition,
and that federal legislation in the corporate law arena is still “rare and
episodic.” 164 Some commentators argue that Delaware has developed
monopoly-like power for the charters of large out-of-state corporations and
has held the other states at bay by taking a middle-of-the-road approach,
balancing appeal to managers and shareholders.165 Other scholars recently
argued that even if states do not actively compete for out-of-state
incorporations, they compete defensively to retain corporations located
within their borders. 166 Still others claim that states do not even compete
defensively because the financial stakes are too low for states other than

162. Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary’s
Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 501–02 (2000); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 748–49 (2002) (concluding
that states, other than Delaware, do not have sufficient financial incentive to compete for
incorporations); Roe, supra note 4.
163. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 604-05; Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A.
Bank & Harwell Wells, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring Corporate Law over Time
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10, 2014; ECGI-Law, Working Paper No.
261, 2014; Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 54, 2014; Temple Univ.
Legal
Studies,
Research
Paper
No.
38,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475242; Roe, supra note 4.
164. Romano, supra note 151, at 46.
165. See e.g., Krešimir Piršl, Trends, Developments, and Mutual Influences Between United
States Corporate Law(s) and European Community Company Law(s), 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 277,
315–17 (2008).
166. George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 505
(2010) (noting that while states do not appear to be competing with Delaware for nationwide
dominance, there is evidence that states take action, e.g., through statutory amendments, to defend
themselves against the possibility that their current companies will leave the state); Gordon
Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors from Liability? (John.
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 1, 2004),
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Moodie_1.pdf (showing that
states that did not react to major statutory innovations, often from Delaware, lost more local
corporations to other states than those that did); Romano, supra note 2, at 226; Roberta Romano,
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214–36 (2006) (tracking the diffusion of certain corporate law innovations
across states and claiming that “after Delaware, states that are early to adopt corporate law
innovations are more likely to succeed in the chartering market by retaining more locallydomiciled firms”).
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Delaware. 167 These commentators claim that political factors and economic
barriers prevent states from competing with Delaware.168
Additionally, some commentators have tried to explain Delaware’s
sustained success by pointing to Delaware’s expert judiciary and their
responsive legislature. 169
Others have noted the positive network
externalities produced by having many other companies formed in the same
state. 170 Professors Robert Anderson and Jeffrey Manns use empirical data
around merger reincorporation to claim that Delaware law does not add
significant economic value and that the state is dominant simply because
lawyers are familiar with the state’s law and assume it is superior. 171
Professors Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried, and Daran Ibrahim contend that
Delaware is dominant, at least in part, because its law serves as “lingua
franca” for investors across the country. 172
B. Indeterminacy and Price Discrimination
Professor Ehud Kamar has argued that the indeterminacy of
Delaware’s corporate law prevents other states from benefiting from
Delaware’s positive learning and network externalities and increases
Delaware’s market power. 173 Professor Kamar with Professor Marcel
Kahan has stated that Delaware uses its significant market power to
increase its profits through price discrimination; currently Delaware enjoys
167. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 699–700 (arguing that the financial incentives for
states to engage in defensive competition are extremely weak because of the minimal amounts
collected from franchise tax revenue and legal business). Kahan and Kamar appear open,
however, to the possibility that the benefits to local lawyers may play a role, albeit a minor role, in
states attempting to retain locally incorporated businesses. Id.
168. Id. at 724–35 (claiming the economic entry barriers are created by Delaware’s expert and
well-paid judges, Delaware’s well-known corporate law, and Delaware’s reputation). The authors
also claim that the political factors deterring competition with Delaware include the relatively
small size and delay of profits from incorporation competition, focus on other priorities, and
opposition of local interest groups. Id.; see also, Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition
for Incorporations (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper, No. 14-19, August 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474658 (arguing that competition literature
can be divided into three debates: (1) a “directional” debate over whether firms would choose
laws that benefit managers or laws that benefit shareholders; (2) a debate on “whether, how, and
which states compete for incorporations,” and (3) a debate around federalism and corporate law).
169. Romano, supra note 151, at 52–55.
170. Klausner, supra note 161, at 844–47 (claiming that the value of a corporation’s charter
increases along with increases in the number of firms formed in the state). Klausner argues that
legal services and judicial precedent are likely to improve with a larger network and that once
Delaware took a commanding lead, there was a self-reinforcing dynamic that helped the state
maintain and even extend its lead. Id.
171. Anderson & Manns, supra note 161.
172. Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca:
Theory and Evidence, 57 J. L. & ECON. 865 (2014).
173. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). Legal indeterminacy creates uncertainty stemming from broad
standards that provide for significant judicial discretion. Id. at 1913–15.
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the ability to charge large firms a premium for incorporation, up to
$180,000 per year. 174 Professor Moshen Manesh has claimed that Delaware
does not have the same market power with LLCs because of, among other
things, the contractibility and reduction of legal indeterminacy in LLC
law. 175 Despite the apparent lack of ability to price discriminate in the LLC
market, professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein concluded that
Delaware has won the competition for LLCs for many of the same reasons
Delaware has won the competition for corporate charters, and that most
other states seem more interested in retaining local LLCs than fighting for
LLCs from outside their state.176
Benefit corporation statutes provide, potentially, even more room for
judicial intervention as they currently mandate a plethora of interests that
directors of benefit corporations must consider. As mentioned above, the
benefit corporation must serve a general public benefit purpose, defined as:
“[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation.” 177 Almost each word in this key
definition could use judicial interpretation. Further, benefit corporation
statutes do not allow contracting around or out of the “general public
benefit purpose” which takes the issue out of the hands private parties and
leaves significant questions for the courts to answer. 178 On the other hand,
benefit corporation statutes provide significant protection to managers,
which means plaintiffs’ attorneys may not find lawsuits worth bringing,
especially if most benefit corporations remain small and unable to pay any
large damage awards. 179 Also, currently, most of the benefit corporations
formed are small entities and incapable or unwilling to pay large

174. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210–14, 1229 (2001) (discussing the evidence and sources of
Delaware’s market power); Corporate and UCC Fee Information: Franchise Tax Calculator,
STATE OF DELAWARE, https://corp.delaware.gov/fee.shtml (noting the maximum fee of $180,000
a year) (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
175. See Manesh, supra note 31, at 220–41 (explaining that Delaware’s network and judicial
advantages are diminished in the LLC context).
176. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 136 (concluding that the quality of the courts is a
major factor in attracting LLCs to Delaware and noting that most substantive provisions do not
appear to have a significant impact in the LLC market).
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§ 102
(2014),
177. MODEL
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf.
178. Callison, supra note 45; J. Haskell Murray, supra note 40.
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§§ 301(c),
303(c),
179. MODEL
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf
(protecting directors and officers, respectively, from monetary damages stemming from the
directors’ and officers’ action or inaction (as long as acting in compliance with general business
duties and the benefit corporation statute) or “failure of the benefit corporation to pursue or create
general public benefit or specific public benefit”).
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incorporation fees. 180 If benefit corporations become a more popular
vehicle for large corporations in the future, and if at least one state can
differentiate its product sufficiently, the indeterminacy in the benefit
corporation law allows for the possibility of significant price
discrimination. The social enterprises built on the LLC base (L3C and
Benefit LLC), however, tend toward increased contractibility where
potential market power may not be as strong. 181
C. Current Financial Stakes and Jurisdictional Positioning
Appendix A to this Article sets forth the number of benefit
corporations and L3Cs formed, respectively, in each state as the given
dates. 182 The data collection process for benefit corporations was
challenging. Kate Cooney (Yale University), Matthew Lee (INSEAD),
Justin Koushyar (Emory University), and I collected data over the course of
more than twelve months. Many states we contacted did not distinguish
between traditional corporations and benefit corporations in their
databases. 183 We had to work our way through secretary of states’ offices
to find someone who even knew what benefit corporations were.
Generally, once we found a knowledgeable person, we had to request a
search of their database. Some states were better organized than others.
Delaware, along with a few other states like California, had been tracking
benefit corporations before we called and were able to provide the data
quickly. 184 For the L3C data we relied on the collection efforts of
interSector Partners, which has been collecting this data consistently. 185
L3Cs are likely a bit easier to track because the statutes generally require
some form of “L3C” in the entity name, while most benefit corporation
statutes do not have naming requirements. 186
The best data to date suggests that there is currently very little at stake
for states in the social enterprise area, with fewer than 5000 social
enterprises formed nationwide.187 This number is insignificant in the face
of almost six million corporations and over three million partnerships

180. Find
a
Benefit
Corporation,
BENEFIT
CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). Most of the
benefit corporations listed are extremely small and many do not even have company websites. Id.
181. Manesh, supra note 31, at 211–16.
182. See infra Appendix A.
183. Part of the benefit corporation legislation pitch to states has been that the law will cost
extremely little to implement.
184. Unfortunately, California notified us that they planned to stop collecting data on our
behalf, our contact person at the state left his position, and it became difficult to find another
person knowledgeable about benefit corporations at their Secretary of State’s office.
185. Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5.
186. See supra Part II.D.
187. See infra Appendix A.

2016]

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET

569

currently in existence. 188 The interest in social enterprises would have to
increase exponentially for any state to make considerable revenue off of
social enterprise franchise fees. States like New Jersey, and South Carolina
have been stuck at single digit numbers of benefit corporations for well
over twelve months. 189 Washington, D.C. also has fewer than ten benefit
corporations and its first (and, for a time, only) benefit corporation was
formed with the assistance of the Georgetown Law Center Social Enterprise
and Nonprofit Clinic. 190 Professor Eric Talley found that only sixty benefit
corporations and fifteen flexible purpose corporations (now called SPCs)
were formed in the first eight months of the California laws being
enacted. 191 Only 5% of the entities formed were headquartered outside of
California, suggesting that virtually no revenue was brought in from
companies outside of the state. 192 Currently, there does not appear to be
vigorous competition for out-of-state social enterprises because so few
exist, making the potential financial rewards for states negligible.
If the financial rewards related to social enterprises are currently so
small, why are states passing social enterprise laws? One logical
explanation could be called “jurisdictional positioning.” Jurisdictional
positioning could be defined as states making sure that they are in a good
starting place when the rewards in an area reach a level worth vigorously
competing to win. Early movers have a distinct advantage in jurisdictional
competition due to significant firm migration costs and the time consuming
gestation of network and learning effects.193 In addition to the potential
188. U.S. CENSUS DEP’T, 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 491 (2012) (based on 2008 federal
tax filings), https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/business.pdf.
189. See infra Appendix A.
190. Georgetown Law Students Incorporate First Benefit Corporation in D.C., GEO. L. (Nov.
21,
2013),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/press-releases/georgetown-law-studentsincorporate-benefit-corporation.cfm.
191. Eric L. Talley, Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from
California (and Beyond) (UC Berkley Public Law Research Paper, No. 2144567, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567.
192. Id. at 8.
193. See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1138–39 (2005) (describing Delaware’s first mover advantages in the
area of traditional corporations). The growth in the “impact investing” movement, which is
partially tied to the social enterprise movement, may be one of the things giving states hope of a
later payday related to social enterprise. ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT
INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011).
Large investment banks like J.P. Morgan and Credit Suisse are devoting more resources to impact
investing, which, at least in part, services social enterprise. See Corporate Responsibility and
Social Finance, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/CorporateResponsibility/social-finance (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Responsible Investments, CREDIT
SUISSE,
https://perspectives.credit-suisse.com/ch/private-clients/investments/en/ourproducts/sustainable-investments/product-range.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Moreover, many
of the nation’s top business schools have established social enterprise or social innovation
programs, signaling that the next generation of business leaders may be more interested in social
businesses. See, e.g., Social Enterprise, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/socialenterprise/
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financial rewards from winning a social enterprise charter competition,
states could also be interested in the potential positive externalities flowing
from social enterprises’ focus on society and the environment.
D. State Niches and Differentiation from Delaware
At this point in jurisdictional competition for business entities, most
states have recognized that they cannot compete with Delaware for
traditional, large corporations. 194 Instead, states have started to find niches
where they can develop expertise and competitive advantage.
Nevada has, perhaps, been the most aggressive challenger of
Delaware, loosening its laws to protect managers (directors and officers)
even more than Delaware and advertising the benefits of Nevada corporate
law heavily. 195 Nevada also charges a much lower maximum franchise tax
than Delaware: $180,000 versus $11,100. 196 Further, Professors Kobayashi
and Ribstein argue that Nevada may be lowering the costs to control
cheating for firms through the adoption of more bright-line rules for
liability. 197 Some authors claim that Nevada is the only state other than
Delaware to openly compete for corporation charters and attract a
significant number of out-of-state corporations. 198 Nevada, however, seems
to focus most of its efforts on closely-held entities. 199 Closely-held entities
are a large group of companies, and perhaps should not be called a niche,
but Nevada seems to be shying away from direct competition with
Delaware over large public companies, where Delaware is strongest. 200
North Dakota attempted to differentiate itself by making its law
friendlier to shareholders and focusing on shareholders and shareholder
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Center for Social Innovation, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS.,
http://csi.gsb.stanford.edu (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Social Impact, WHARTON, U. OF PA.,
http://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/projects/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Center for the
Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship, DUKE, THE FUQUA SCH. OF BUS.,
http://www.caseatduke.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
194. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with James Woulfe, Public Policy and Impact Investing
Specialist at the Social Enterprise Trust (Jan. 29, 2015) (discussing how Connecticut is looking
for ways to attract types of businesses, such as social enterprises, that may not be Delaware’s
primary focus).
195. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free
Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 949–56, 964–65 (2012).
196. Id. at 973–74. As Professor Barzuza notes, even though Nevada is less expensive than
Delaware, Nevada charges a maximum initial fee of $30,000 in addition to its maximum annual
fee of $11,100, which is much more expensive for incorporation than many other states. Id.
Corporate and UCC Fee Information: Franchise Tax Calculator, supra note 174.
197. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1168–69 (2012).
198. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 716 (citing John G. Edwards, Nevada Joins the
Company of Top Incorporation States, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 8, 1998, at 1K).
199. Id. at 716–17; Piršl, supra note 165, at 317.
200. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 2.
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activists, rather than managers. 201 By most accounts, however, North
Dakota’s experiment, while an interesting one, failed to attract many out-ofstate corporations. 202 Although North Dakota tried a different strategy than
Delaware, it did not seem to focus on a narrower group of companies like
most of the other states mentioned in this Section. This lack of narrow
focus may have hurt North Dakota.
Outside of Nevada and North Dakota, numerous other states have
attempted to chip away at Delaware by focusing on relatively narrow types
of companies. These companies are often in complex industries that require
special expertise, sophisticated laws, and benefit from tax or other favorable
treatment. For example, Wyoming and South Dakota have gotten into the
asset protection and trust race.203 Oregon has attempted to be a leader for
green companies, even before the current social enterprise law movement
began in earnest in the United States.204 Connecticut has made a bid for
financial services companies through tax provisions and other laws. 205
Maryland has attracted a number of regulated investment firms, such as
Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”). In 2000, Maryland ranked
second only to Delaware in the ranking of incorporations of U.S. public
companies. 206 Massachusetts, like Maryland, has gained some traction in
201. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 150–51 (2009)
(explaining North Dakota’s strategy of focusing on a different group of corporate stakeholders,
namely shareholder activists).
202. Barzuza, supra note 195, at 971. Barzuza and others mention American Railcar
Industries, Inc. as one of, if not the only, major corporation to reincorporate in North Dakota. Id.
Carl C. Icahn, who had supported the North Dakota legal changes, controlled American Railcar.
Id.; see also Joshua P. Fershee, The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act: A Branding
Initiative Without a (North Dakota) Brand, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89, 1105 (2008).
203. See Timothy O. Beppler & Christopher M. Reimer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A
Comparison of the Laws of Utah and Wyoming, UTAH B.J., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 12, 16 (mentioning
that, unlike some states, Wyoming does not impose income tax on trusts); Clay D. Geittmann,
Chaos to Comprehension: Estate Planning in Wyoming, WYO. LAW., Dec. 2007, at 18, 20
(claiming that amendments to Wyoming law in 2007 to allow for self-settled asset protection
trusts helped make Wyoming extremely competitive in the relatively narrow competition for
trusts); Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s Emergence as a Leading
Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 194–95 (2011) (calling Wyoming a top destination
for trusts, due, at least in part, to board powers for the settlor).
204. Robert C. Illig, supra note 125, at 189 (dating Oregon’s efforts in the green business area
to 2007 and attributing at least part of the growth in this industry to an organization called Oregon
Lawyers for a Sustainable Future); Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to
Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491, 495–502 (2009) (mentioning the growth of
green or sustainable businesses and noting that Oregon “has already begun efforts to position
itself as ‘the Delaware of green business’” through amendments to its corporate code).
205. John R. Shaughnessy & Scott E. Sebastian, 2010 Connecticut Tax Law Developments, 85
CONN. B.J. 71, 80–82 (2011); Richard W. Tomeo, Connecticut Takes Bold Steps in the Taxation
of Financial Service Companies, 8 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 209, 210 (1998).
206. Professors Kahan and Kamar claim that Maryland’s success in this niche area can be
traced to the minimal franchise tax and “Maryland’s attraction for investment funds is based on
the fact that Maryland law contains a number of statutory provisions targeted at investment
companies, including provisions designed to assure that the investment company satisfies federal

572

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:541

the REIT area. 207 Massachusetts also appears to compete in the business
trust and mutual fund areas. 208
Given that some of the rhetoric used by proponents of social enterprise
has been largely critical of traditional Delaware corporate law, social
enterprise may be a niche that other states think they can dominate, or at
least compete on a more even playing field. 209 In addition to attempting to
find a niche in the competition for business entities, another (more cynical)
explanation of the widespread passage of social enterprise law is based on
the interest groups involved. The next Part explores the influence of these
interest groups on the passage of social enterprise legislation and on the
social enterprise movement in general.210
IV. INTEREST GROUPS AND SKEPTICS
Interest group theory has significant explanatory power with regard to
the recent proliferation of social enterprise laws, which skeptics can claim
are not being passed for the good of the public, but rather for a relatively
small group that stand to benefit from the laws. The interest group theory
of legislation, also called the economic theory of legislation, posits that
legislation will be bought and sold as a good to the group that values it
most. 211 Under this theory, interest groups use currency consisting of
tax requirements, a waiver of the requirement to hold annual meetings of shareholders, and a grant
of power to the board of an investment company to increase the number of authorized shares
without shareholder approval.” Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 721; see also Guhan
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1815–16 (2002)
(noting that virtually all of Maryland’s success in attracting public companies is due to its success
in attracting REITs); Charles M. Elson, Book Review, 52 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1004 (1997) (reviewing
NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE INV. TRUSTS, THE PUBLIC REIT LEGAL SOURCEBOOK (1995))
(commenting on Maryland and Delaware’s relative strength in the REIT area).
207. Daines, supra note 157, at 1572 n.51; Sheldon A. Jones, Laura M. Moret & James M.
Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 421, 428–29 (1988) (noting Massachusetts’ competition in the business trust area, in part
through favorable statutes and case law); William L. Martin II, Federal Regulation of Real Estate
Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 316, 316 n.2 (1978) (noting that
REITS often form as Massachusetts business trusts).
208. See Diane M. Ring, Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation Through
the Experience of Financial Instruments, 51 TAX L. REV. 663, 667 (1996) (describing
Massachusetts’ strength in the mutual fund industry).
209. TEDx Talks, TEDxPhilly—Jay Coen Gilbert—On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE, at
9:45–10:02 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU (claiming that
maximizing shareholder value is “the only game in town” in Delaware (citing eBay Domestic
Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)). See generally Clark & Vranka, supra note 27.
210. See infra Part V.
211. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986). See generally
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L.J. 31, 35 (1991) (“The defining theme of the interest group theory of lawmaking is its rejection
of the presumption that the government endeavors to further the public interest. Rather, under
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“political support, promises of future favors, outright bribes, and whatever
else politicians value” to achieve passage of legislation that favors the
interest groups’ desires. 212 Using microeconomic tools, the interest group
theory claims the price an interest group ultimately pays will be influenced
interest group theory, all the participants in the political process act to further their self-interest.”);
Macey, supra note 193, at 1136–37 (claiming that attorneys are the primary interest group that
benefits under their theory); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (applying interest group theory
to Delaware corporate law).
George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 240 (2009) (“In very general terms,
the interest-group theory of the legislative process conceptualizes legislation as carrying out a
transfer of benefits from one group (typically thought to be large, disorganized, and with diffuse
interests, such as taxpayers generally) to some other group (small, focused, and easily organized,
such as persons or firms having some common, special interest.” (first citing DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23 (1991); then
citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); and then citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4, 10–11 (1971))).
212. Macey, supra note 211, at 227–28 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)). Later
in the article Macey also mentions “investing in congressional retirement funds” and paying
“honoraria for speaking engagements” as other currency used by interest groups to purchase
legislative favors. Id. at 230 (citing G. Easterbrook, What’s Wrong With Congress?, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70–72). Professor Elhauge writes that “interest groups influence the
political process . . . by paying lawmakers in the form of bribes, speaking fees, supportive
advertising, campaign contributions, or offers of future employment; by pressuring political
officials to support or oppose the appointment, promotion, removal, or budget of regulators; and
by influencing the information that reaches legislators, regulators, and the voting public.”
Elhauge, supra note 211, at 35–36 (first citing DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 39–41 (1974); then citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371–72, 392 (1983); then citing Jonathan
R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 223, 230–31 (1986); then citing William Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State
Regulation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 636 (1987); then citing Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213–14 (1976); and then citing George Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971)); see also William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); accord John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2387, 2410–12 (2003). Macey claims:
[S]tatutes generally can be divided into three distinct categories. The first are those
designed to advance some public purpose, such as protection of the environment or
providing for national defense. Besides these public interest statutes, there are two
types of special interest statutes—”open-explicit” statutes and “hidden-implicit”
statutes. Open-explicit statutes are naked, undisguised wealth transfers to a particular,
favored group. By contrast, hidden-implicit statutes are couched in public interest
terms to avoid the political fallout associated with blatant special interest statutes.
Hidden-implicit statutes exist because the political costs of enacting them is lower
than the political costs of enacting open-explicit statutes. We observe open-explicit
statutes because they are less ambiguous and therefore more likely to be enforced in
precisely the way the relevant interest groups prefer. As described below, in deciding
whether to lobby for one type of statute or another, interest groups must make a tradeoff between the higher political costs associated with open-explicit statutes and the
greater uncertainty associated with hidden-implicit statutes.
Macey, supra note 211, at 232–33.
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by the value of the legislation to the group and the costs of organizing the
coalition. 213
Small and large interest groups each have their advantages and
challenges. The legislative benefits are less diluted and coordination is
easier for smaller interest groups.214
Larger interest groups have
advantages that include: “(1) more votes, (2) some economies of scale, and
(3) perhaps more total resources.” 215 Interest group resources appear
important regardless of size, and the success of an interest group may
depend, in part, on the attributes of any opposing interest groups. Interest
groups may thrive in a representative government because information
costs involving the impact of legislation can be high and transaction costs
for organizing lobbying groups, while limiting free-riders, may be

213. Elhauge, supra note 211, at 36–37 (discussing collective action problems); Landes &
Posner, supra note 212, at 877.
214. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 266 (1982); see also Elhauge, supra note 211, at 37–40
(stating that “large diffuse groups face greater collective action obstacles to group petitioning in
three respects:” (1) “for any given level of aggregate group benefits, large diffuse groups are more
susceptible to free rider problems because the benefits from seeking or opposing a particular legal
change must be spread over a larger number of beneficiaries,” (2) “given a particular incentive to
free ride, a larger group will have a tougher time organizing collective efforts to overcome free
riding. Having a large number of members makes it more difficult and costly to identify
members, reach collective cost-sharing agreements, and monitor and punish free riding. In small
groups, free riding will be easier to detect because it has a proportionally larger effect. Small
groups also generally have lower organizational costs, and their members are more likely to have
ongoing personal contact, making monitoring easier and making social sanctions, in particular,
more effective,” (3) “for any given level of per capita benefit to group members from a legal
change, a larger group will likely face a smaller opposition that is more motivated because it
suffers greater per capita costs. Hence, large groups are not just less effective in their own right;
they also generally face more effective opposition than small groups. . . . The confluence of these
advantages and disadvantages may not benefit small groups per se. Rather, it may benefit those
small to medium-sized groups that enjoy optimal combinations of free-riding avoidance, weak
opposition, voting power, resources, and economies of scale.” (footnote omitted)); Rachel Sachs,
The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 344, 349
(2013–14) (noting the advantages of relatively small interest groups and stating that “legislative
activity will be dominated by comparatively small interest groups with members who would reap
a disproportionate share of any legislated benefit, while the costs of such legislation are dispersed
far more widely” (first citing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 128 (1965); then citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 292 (1965); and then citing Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
266 (1982))).
215. Elhauge, supra note 211, at 39 (first citing Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1976); then citing George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 13 (1971); then citing MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 47 (2d ed. 1971); then citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 380 (1983); then
citing Peltzman, supra, at 213; Stigler, supra, at 12; then citing RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION 45 (1982); and then citing Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCL. 335, 349 (1974)).
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significant. 216 Groups with lower information costs and lower transaction
costs may be more effective in achieving wealth transfers from groups with
greater organizational challenges. 217
Interest group theory works well to explain the widespread adoption
and development of social enterprise law. While public interest theory
holds that “the ideal and the actual function of legislation [is] to increase
economic welfare by correcting market failures,” a shift from the
“dominant public perception of ‘government as helper’” to distrust and
focus on private interests appears to be descriptively accurate. 218 The
various interests groups, discussed below, appear to have catalyzed the
passage of the social enterprise legislation and have made a compelling
case to legislators. However, politicians have mixed motives, and a strong
version of interest group theory, whereby legislation is solely justified by
interest group preferences and efforts, likely overstates the reality. 219
A. The Activists
Social enterprise activists, as used here, are individuals or
organizations that lobby for the passage of social enterprise law and
strongly support the social enterprise movement, often with some personal
and professional motives. Social enterprise activists are not only influential
in getting laws passed, but may also serve as evaluators of the various state
216. Macey, supra note 211, at 229.
217. Id. at 229–30 (“The major implications of interest group theory are that legislation
transfers wealth from society as a whole to those discrete, well-organized groups that enjoy
superior access to the political process, and that government will enact laws that reduce societal
wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these economic groups. The economic theory
of legislation does not predict that all laws will enrich the few at the expense of the many, but it
does predict that this will be the dominant outcome and that there will be a trend in this direction.”
(citing M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 75–117 (1982))).
218. Macey, supra note 211, at 223; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982) (citing W. BAUMOL,
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE (2d ed. 1965) and A. PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932)).
219. Sachs, supra note 214, at 350–51 (citing research showing “that the effect of interest
group pressure on Congress could ‘range from insignificant to determinative,’ depending on ‘the
configuration of a large number of factors—among them the nature of the issue, the nature of the
demand, the structure of political competition, and the distribution of resources.’” (quoting KAY
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 317 (1986))). Later, Sachs notes, “where legislation is ‘applicable to a particular
industry,’ interest group theory likely has comparatively greater explanatory power. Ultimately,
the ‘best picture of the political process’ is one in which ‘constituent interest, special interest
groups, and ideology all influence legislative conduct.’” Id. at 351 (first quoting Posner, supra
note, 218, at 271; then quoting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 900–01 (1987); then citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33 (1991); then citing Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31,
43 (1991); and then citing Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1067–68 (2003)).
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laws and may direct entrepreneurs to the states that the activists think have
better laws. 220 As such, state government officials seem to be aware of the
influential social enterprise activists.
Bob Lang seems to be the primary social enterprise activist for the
L3C form, while the nonprofit organization B Lab has been the biggest
player in the benefit corporation area.221 Bob Lang may not have included
enough supporters, with sufficient resources, to support the widespread
adoption of the L3C legislation, and the criticism and constructive
suggestions for change do not appear to have led to significant amendments
to the substance of the L3C legislation. 222 On the other hand, B Lab
appears more inclusive and has been able to reach out to a wider range of
people and amass more resources, even though the core B Lab team has
remained relatively small. 223 While B Lab has not always been successful
in bringing people in the social enterprise area together, they appear to have
made a good faith attempt to consider opposing views and have modified
their model legislation a number of times. 224
220. Murray, supra note 54, at 350–51 (discussing B Lab’s issues with the Delaware public
benefit corporation statutes, including that the statutes do not require public posting of the benefit
report and do not require use of a third party standard); Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at app. C.
(discussing the perceived weaknesses of the flexible purpose corporation statute, including that it
is a “cumbersome” law, that the “special purpose” requirement is not broad or flexible enough,
and that the statute does not provide the same level of transparency and accountability as the
benefit corporation statute because of limitations on reporting and the non-requirement of a thirdparty standard).
FOR
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT,
221. AMERICANS
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (last visited June 20, 2015) (compiling
information about the L3C, including information about Bob Lang, the inspiration of the L3C
entity form). Attorney Marc Lane has also been extremely active in the L3C movement. About
J.
LANE
WEALTH
GROUP,
Our
Founder,
MARC
http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=AboutOurFounder&category=About
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (calling Marc Lane “the force behind Illinois’ Low-profit Limited
Liability Company (L3C) legislation” and claiming that he “has been instrumental in promoting
L3C legislation in other states”).
222. See generally Bishop, supra note 14; Brewer, supra note 19; Callison & Vestal, supra
note 18; Kleinberger, supra note 18; Murray & Hwang, supra note 19. To the author’s
knowledge, none of the suggestions in these articles by respected academics and practitioners
have been adopted in L3C legislation. See., e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163
(2010).
223. Maribel Morey, The Rockefeller Foundation’s Hand in Hobby Lobby, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.,
Aug.
21,
2014,
http://www.ssireview.org/bl/entry/the_rockefeller_foundations_hand_in_hobby_lobby
(noting
that B Lab was an early recipient of a Rockefeller Foundation grant); Our Team,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-bBCORPORATION.NET,
corps/our-team (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (noting that two of the three B Lab founders previously
ran “AND1, a $250 million basketball footwear and apparel business” before co-founding B Lab).
224. Callison, supra note 29, at 159 (discussing the heated debates, over more than three
years, between B Lab and the Corporate Laws Drafting Committee under the Colorado Bar
Association). Stanford Psychology Professor Carol Dweck’s description of the differences
between a growth mindset (learning from criticism) and a fixed mindset (ignoring useful
feedback) can provide useful advice to all those involved in social enterprise. See generally
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These activists are a new feature in the jurisdictional competition
landscape. Other entity forms did not seem to have similarly visible,
organized, and influential champions. These social enterprise forms are the
first forms that explicitly mix social purpose and private profit, thus
attracting supporters who seek success in both areas. These activists have
led to more rapid passage of the social enterprise forms than may have
occurred if the process were more organic. 225 While most of the interest
groups below have been discussed in the jurisdictional competition
literature, activists like Bob Lang and B Lab seem to be absent. Both Bob
Lang and B Lab profit from the existence of social enterprise. Bob Lang
provides social enterprise consulting services and B Lab charges social
enterprises for its certification. 226
Other social enterprise activists like lawyers and additional service
providers have also entered the fray, albeit with more minor roles. B Lab
appears to have exerted significant effort to recruit these supportive
business people and lawyers. 227 Most of these professionals seem hopeful
of gaining some personal benefits from their newfound expertise in the
social enterprise law and an entire industry has evolved to advise these new
social enterprises. 228 Consultants, financial services professionals, and
CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS (2006). Those with growth
mindsets, open to change and improvement, are most likely to flourish. Id.
225. Deborah Sweeney, The Evolution of an Entity: A Closer Look at Benefit Corporations,
MY CORPORATION (Sept. 9, 2013), http://blog.mycorporation.com/2013/09/the-evolution-of-anentity-a-closer-look-at-benefit-corporations-infographic/ (comparing the spread of benefit
corporation legislation to the spread of LLC legislation). This infographic is a bit misleading
because the LLC form spread very quickly once the IRS weighed in on the form, but it took a few
decades for the IRS to act. Id.
226. Make it Official, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (listing the annual
certification fee ranges from $500 to $50,000+ based on annual sales). B Lab is, however, a
nonprofit corporation and it provides its third-party standard, though not its certification, for free.
About B Lab, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010) (noting that the B Impact Assessment is “A Free and Confidential Tool to
Compare your Company’s Impact.”) Bob Lang’s Americans for Community Development
provides a variety of services for L3Cs, and is currently developing certification courses for social
enterprise advisors. Certification, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/certification.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2015).
227. See, e.g., Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 1 (listing drafting authors and some
supporters of a white paper advocating for the advancement of benefit corporation law).
INTERSECTOR
PARTNERS,
L3C,
228. See,
e.g.,
About
Us,
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (stating that their services
include “Social Enterprise strategy &
development”); B CORP ADVISORS,
http://bcorpadvisors.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (explaining that “B Corp Advisors helps
organizations and executive teams understand, evaluate and implement the legal and business
dimensions of: Benefit Corporations, Flexible Purpose Corporations, Certified B Corporations,
Other Sustainable or Hybrid Legal Forms”); BLUE DOT ADVOCATES, http://www.bluedotlaw.com
(last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (a law firm with a focus on social enterprise and impact investing);
MARC J. LANE WEALTH GROUP, LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (“L3CS”)
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lawyers serving the social sector have accounted for a significant portion of
the social enterprises formed to date.229 While these service providers are
becoming more of a factor, Bob Lang and B Lab still appear largely in
control of their respective social enterprise movements.
B. The Business Managers
Managers of business entities make up another interest group that
appears to be impacting social enterprise law drafting, adoption, and
implementation. 230 These managers may reasonably be concerned not only
with the success of their businesses, but, more personally, with addressing
their own potential liability. 231 To date, the social enterprise laws have
generally offered managers significant protection. 232
These social
enterprise laws limit the standing of those who can bring a claim and make
building a successful claim extremely difficult. 233 External stakeholders are
not expressly given standing to sue in any of the existing social enterprise
statutes, even though the statutes require consideration of their interests. 234
Further, the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, upon which most state
benefit corporation statutes are based, provides that directors are not
personally liable for monetary damages for “failure of the benefit
corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or specific public
http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?submenu=L3C&submenu=Social_Enterprises&src=gendoc
s&ref=L3C&category=Capabilities (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (claiming to be “recognized as a
UPSPRING,
national
leader
in
the
development
of
L3Cs”);
Our
Story,
http://upspringassociates.com/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (“We serve the social
enterprise community with effective and sustainable consulting services”); WESTAWAY LAW,
http://westawaylaw.com/about (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (“an innovative law firm committed to
serving the social enterprise sector”).
229. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 263 (2014) (noting that 31% of early Delaware public benefit
corporations were in professional services, many servicing the social sector).
230. The term “managers,” as used here, refers to the board of directors and/or executive
officers. See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business
as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2034–35, 2035 n.29 (2002) (using the term
“managers” to refer to directors and/or officers).
231. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1088 n.179 (2000) (discussing the backlash and
statutory response resulting from Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) in which the
directors were held liable for breaching the duty of care).
232. See supra Part II.F (explaining how the significant liability protection for managers has
been a mainstay in social enterprise legislation).
233. Murrray, supra note 66.
234. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011). Most
benefit corporation statutes, however, do expressly allow benefit corporation managers to choose
external stakeholders that may have standing. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-790 To date, the author is not aware of any benefit corporation that has granted standing
to an external stakeholder. While such a grant of standing is certainly possible, especially for the
benefit corporations that deeply care about accountability, most social enterprises are unlikely to
allow another standing to sue and disrupt their business.
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benefit.” 235 Delaware’s PBC law protects director actions if the directors’
decisions are informed, disinterested, and not irrational. 236 As long as they
are largely protected from liability, managers of socially conscious firms
have been generally supportive of social enterprise law, even if their
companies have not yet made the switch. B Lab has utilized these
managers, many of whom are influential in their respective states, as
supporters, and B Lab has seemingly extended its influence by enlisting
these significant tax-paying proponents. 237
C. The Skeptics
A number of academics and some sophisticated lawyers have
criticized all or part of the social enterprise laws. 238 Some of the critics
have contributed to the evolution of social enterprise laws, and academics
such as Daniel Kleinberger and Carter Bishop, along with practitioner Bill
Callison, played a large role in the apparent stall and decline of the L3C
form. 239 B Lab has attempted to reach out to academics and high-level
legal practitioners to discuss the Model legislation, but B Lab has also been
criticized for failing to modify certain controversial provisions of the Model
legislation. 240 As Macey and Miller recognize, lawyers often act as the
gatekeepers of corporate law but frequently, in the social enterprise context,
bar association committees are being overruled or pressured into approving
the laws by other interest groups. 241 While some of the skeptics have
simply criticized without providing any constructive solutions, most of the
skeptics have offered ways forward and could improve the future of social
enterprise laws. 242

235. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 301(c)(2) (2014).
236. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2011 & Supp. 2015); Delaware Public Benefit
Corporations: FAQs (on file with author).
237. See State
by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (listing key
supporters such as the businesses of Hawthorne Auto Clinic (Oregon), West Paw Design
(Montana), and Dansko (Pennsylvania).
238. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
ACCOUNTABILITY
REV.
17
(2014),
http://law.emory.edu/ecgar/_documents/volumes/1/1/greenfield.pdf; Kleinberger supra note 18,
Bishop supra note 18; Callison & Vestal, supra note 18; Murray supra note 40, at 22–24
(discussing areas of possible improvements for the benefit corporation law); Murray & Hwang,
supra note 19, at 42–50 (discussing possible improvements for the L3C law).
239. Kleinberger, supra note 18; Bishop supra note 18; Callison & Vestal, supra note 18.
240. Callison, supra note 29, at 161–63 (Bill Callison was an attorney involved in the benefit
corporation debates and legislative drafting process in Colorado).
241. Id.; Macey & Miller, supra note 211, at 503–506 (discussing the role of the Delaware
bar).
242. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO
MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 9–13 (arguing against “happy talk” to make people feel better and
arguing that anxious, critical people can make organizations stronger over time).
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D. The Politicians
Under the interest group theory of legislation, politicians act in their
own self-interest, for example they may act consistent with their desire to
be reelected or keep their political party in power. 243 “In public choice
legal scholarship, the role of the legislator has been transformed from that
of a passive broker to a rent-seeking actor. A rent-seeking legislator
strategically uses the threat of negative regulation or the promise of
favorable regulation to secure interest group payments.” 244
For state politicians, the reasons to support social enterprise laws are
readily apparent. Social business is popular; Wall Street and traditional forprofit corporations are not. 245 Even for the pro-market, pro-Wall Street
politicians, these laws purport to embrace freedom, do not force anyone to
incorporate under the laws, and expressly deny altering the existing
corporate laws. Social enterprise laws allow the market to operate. The
statutes appear to appeal to both the social justice advocates on the left and
to the free market proponents on the right. 246 Research has shown that a
“larger ‘green’ workforce exerts a significant positive influence on Benefit
Corporation legislation passage,” suggesting that environmentally-friendly
states are especially interested in social enterprise law. 247 Additionally,
social enterprise laws have been promoted as no cost or low cost to states.
Currently, there are not state-level tax breaks for the social enterprises and
not even much in the way of necessary changes at secretary of state’s
offices, as the social enterprises are often simply included in the LLC or
corporation framework. The benefits, therefore, do not have to be large to
justify passage of these laws in the eyes of politicians. While a few cities,
such as San Francisco and Philadelphia, have provided some financial
benefits to social enterprises, the benefits to date have been quite small.248
States may attract some businesses to the state and may gain some revenue,
with negligible costs, or so the pitch goes. The activists and business
243. Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: “RentSeeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 971, 1034–35 n.326; Elhauge,
supra note 211.
244. Knauer, supra note 243, at 1036 (first citing Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 361 (1988); and then citing Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S.
McChesney, Review Essay, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 893 (1987)).
245. OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/ (detailing a nationwide movement
against “the ruling class”).
246. Kyle Westaway, Something Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Apr.
17,
2012),
Entrepreneurship,
STAN.
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/something_republicans_and_democrats_can_agree_on_social_entrepr
eneurship.
247. Hans Rawhouser, Michael Cummings & Andrew Crane, Benefit Corporation Legislation
and the Emergence of a Social Hybrid Category, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 13, 18 (2015).
248. Murray, supra note 40.
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managers, mentioned above, are likely vocal, motivated, and influential
groups, as those groups pay taxes, vote, and have a good bit to gain from
the legislation. While the skeptics also pay taxes and vote, they appear to
have less to gain and fewer resources. State bar associations have been
involved, to some extent, in the political process, but they have not been
significantly involved in every state’s process. 249 Occasionally, a state
politician warms to the social enterprise movement enough to take the
legislation to a vote with little or no support from the state bar association.
V. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET
A. Leaders and Laggards
According to the early data, the current leaders in the nascent social
enterprise market are Delaware, Nevada, Maryland, California, and New
York. 250 It is, however, much too early to crown a winner. Delaware
seems to have started relatively strong based on its reputation in corporate
law. Nevada has been attempting to challenge Delaware on other fronts
and is pushing to be a leader in corporate law. Nevada is in the lead
currently, but may have been boosted by the inclusion of a benefit
corporation check box on the state form, which incorporators may or may
not have fully understood. 251 Maryland has done relatively well by virtue
of being the very first mover; Maryland has a year or more head start on
most states. Finally, New York and California have done relatively well,
probably because they are large states and have more social enterprises
located in their states that want to use local law.252
The District of Columbia, New Jersey, and South Carolina have
lagged; they are all stuck in the single digits of benefit corporations
formed. 253 From the L3C side, Rhode Island, Maine, and Wyoming have
lagged. 254 Excluding New Jersey, these states all have relatively low
population levels, coupled with a relative lack of corporate law expertise.
The Delaware experience might suggest that small size is an advantage, but
the business law expertise to attract out-of-state firms, state population, and
business formations within the state will likely be correlated. New Jersey is
249. See State
by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (listing, for example, the Florida Bar
Association, as a “key supporter” of the benefit corporation legislation).
250. See infra Appendix A.
251. Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30.
252. Cf. Subramanian, supra note 206, at 1814–16 (noting that California is a top home for
corporate headquarters, but underperforms in the incorporation market if the share of
headquartered corporations are taken into account; New York, likewise, seems to underperform in
the incorporation market relative to its headquarter status, which is much stronger).
253. See infra Appendix A.
254. See infra Appendix A.

582

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:541

a curious addition to this group; as mentioned, previously it was a leader in
corporate law, is close to New York City, and has a relatively large
population itself. From personal interaction with people in the New Jersey
Department of State, my working hypothesis is that the relative lack of
knowledge of social enterprise within that office is limiting the formation of
benefit corporations in the state.255 However, with only about 1000 entities
at the number one state, no state has established itself as dominant.
B. Attracting Social Enterprises
The literature dealing with more established entity types suggests that
states can attract social enterprises by: (1) being an early mover; (2) having
an expert and responsive legal system; (3) making a credible commitment
to the desired infrastructure; and (4) engaging the corporate bar.256
Commentators have also mentioned geographic proximity to major
financial and political centers as an advantage. 257 Surprisingly, one
argument that apparently has not been made in the scholarly literature is the
importance of states engaging the legal academy.
Lessons from the literature can be applied to the social enterprise
situation, along with the suggested importance of engaging the academy.
Regarding its being an early mover, Delaware’s experience shows that
while it is not necessary to be a first mover to eventually dominate a law
market, it appears that being an early mover is advantageous.258 Being an
early mover in social enterprise may position states to take the lead in that
niche area, but those early states must be willing to amend their laws to
keep up with the developments. 259 States wish to be in a good position
relative to other states regarding any competition involving social
255. Of the states I contacted, the New Jersey Secretary of State was the least helpful and
seemed to be the least knowledgeable about these new forms. See Secretary of State—Corporate
Filings, N.J. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.nj.gov/state/archives/catsestat03.html (last visited Sept.
4, 2015).
256. See infra Part V.B (Present and Future).
257. Christopher M. Bruner, Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial
World 58 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2013-19, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343111.
258. Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for
Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 687 (2003).
Learning and network effects accumulate over time and states that enter an area early have an
advantage.
259. States that are entering the social enterprise area now, after over twenty statutes have
been passed, are able to learn from the mistakes and imperfections in other state statutes. As a
general rule, the more recent social enterprise statutes seem more nuanced and evolved than the
early statutes. To date, states have not seemed to be updating their social enterprise statutes as
other states innovate in their new statutes. Once the social enterprise statutes are passed, the states
have shown little interest in amending them, with a notable exception being the FPC in California.
Plerhoples, supra note 129. The FPC amendments included a name change and some other minor
statutory changes. Id.
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enterprise, but do not seem willing to spend significant funds yet. 260 With
respect to having an expert and responsive legal system, states interested in
the social enterprise law market may wish to learn from Delaware. Some
attribute Delaware’s success to its indeterminate case law and expert
judiciary. 261 Others credit, at least in part, an appropriately responsive
legislature, the admired Chancery Court, and administrative expertise. 262
States could start by forming a business law court (if they do not already
have one) and could also make commitments to regularly revise their social
enterprise law to respond to developments.263 A credible commitment to
social enterprise might include funding incubator space, being the first state
to provide a significant tax benefit to social enterprise, 264 a responsive
secretary of state’s office, and perhaps eventually developing a financial
reliance on the social enterprises formed in the state.265 The corporate bar,
composed of both litigation and transactional attorneys, likely influences
the market for business law. 266 Attorneys advise their clients where to
260. See supra Part IV.D (explaining how most states are currently spending relatively little
money on social enterprises).
261. Kamar, supra note 173, at 1910–13, 1927–28, 1935.
262. ROMANO, supra note 1, at 39–42.
263. See Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and Proposed
Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 488, 502–03 (2007)
(surveying fifteen business courts and proposing a framework for evaluation of business courts
that includes attention to “efficiency, quality, and due process”).
264. Significant tax incentives could be a game changer but would be costly to a state and
should be considered carefully to avoid greenwashing. The tax incentives offered to date have
been very small, but tax incentives may be among the most effective, though costly, things a state
can do to attract social enterprises. See, e.g., The California Benefit Corporation Discount
F.
ADMIN.
CODE
§ 14C.3
(June
3,
2012),
Ordinance,
S.
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco
_ca (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (In its S. F. ADMIN. CODE § 14C.3, San Francisco provided
preferences in government contracting to California benefit corporations, but these provisions
expired on Sept. 1, 2015); see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social
Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 439–41 (2014) (arguing that full charitable tax benefits should
not be offered to social enterprises, but arguing for a few tax accommodations for social
enterprises such as expanding the deductibility of charitable contributions); cf. Philadelphia First
City to Offer Green Biz Tax Incentives, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/19350 (last visited Sept. 15,
2013) (providing small tax credits to certain Certified B Corporations) Certified B Corporations
can be any of the legal entity forms, including benefit corporation, traditional corporation, or
LLC).
265. Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the
Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1178–79 (2008) (commenting on
Delaware’s credible commitment, including “investment in legal capital (i.e., judicial expertise,
case law, a specialized bar, and a business-like Division of Corporations) and its reliance on
franchise taxes”). States like Delaware, New York, California, Nevada, and Maryland, which
already have significant infrastructure built for related entity forms, may have a sizeable lead on
other states, given that they already have some commitment to other entity types and businesses,
in addition to the resources needed.
266. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 705–06 (arguing that “[t]he driving force behind
many corporate statutes is corporate lawyers” but noting collective action problems and the lack
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incorporate and are often involved in state politics. Attorneys are pointed
to as one of the reasons that states still amend their corporate law in spite of
the limited financial incentives for most states.267 Attorneys may also be
involved, directly or indirectly, in getting laws passed that encourage
formations in their home state or at least encourage local entities to stay in
their state.268 Attorneys are likely to advise their clients to form in states
where they are familiar with the state law: primarily their home state and
Delaware. Thus, if states are interested in attracting social enterprises, they
need to reach attorneys and educate them about the benefits of their social
enterprise laws. 269
Geographic proximity to the financial capital (New York City) and the
political capital (Washington, D.C.) of the United States may account for
some of Delaware’s success. 270 States near New York City and
Washington, D.C. may have an advantage in any future social enterprise
competition.
Social enterprise, however, seems strongest among
progressives, who are more highly concentrated on the west coast.
Moreover, geographic proximity to economic and political centers may
have decreased in importance as travel has become and is becoming much
easier. States that are not close to financial and political centers may
increase their competitiveness by funding excellent transportation systems
within their state for easy travel for business people and attorneys
representing those businesses.
Interestingly, the literature on jurisdictional competition has not paid
much attention to the influence of the legal academy. Law professors have
significant impact on the future of the law through their role in training
future attorneys. If law students learn Delaware law while in school, they
may be more likely to advise their clients to incorporate under Delaware
law. Current and former Delaware judges spend a substantial amount of
time interacting with corporate professors in the legal academy. 271 Most
of strong incentives (citing William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 715, 737–49 (1998))).
267. Id. at 696.
268. Romano, supra note 151 (noting that “by prodding legislatures to innovate or imitate
another state’s innovation, in response to exogenous shocks caused by changing business and
legal circumstances, [lawyers] benefit their clients and thereby themselves, by maintaining, if not
expanding, their practice, by making their state a more appealing domicile”).
269. As discussed below, it may be easiest and most efficient to reach law professors and law
students because states may have a more eager audience at law schools than in the busy
marketplace.
270. Bruner, supra note 257, at 58, 60.
271. Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine writes law review articles and
teaches at multiple law schools. Leo Strine Author Page, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=328830 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014)
(showing over thirty legal articles by Chief Justice Leo Strine and listing his adjunct position at
University of Pennsylvania Law School along with his lecturer on law position at Harvard Law
School). Chief Justice Strine has even co-authored articles with corporate law professors. See,
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judges in other states do not seem quite as involved with the legal
academy. 272 States interested in becoming a leader in social enterprise law
should consider involving the legal academic world in their discussions and
encouraging more engagement between governmental officials and
professors. Incubators for social enterprises, which involve universities and
state governments may be one way forward in this area. 273 Also, if
professors, especially corporate law professors, are aware of the uniqueness
of a state’s social enterprise law, and are convinced that it is a valuable
addition to the entity menu, the professors may discuss the law with their
classes. 274 In time, just as most law students graduate knowing Delaware
corporate law, we could reach a point where law students graduate knowing

e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew Jennejohn, Putting Stockholders
First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 n.* (2013) (stating that
LawrenceHamermesh is a longtime professor at Widener Law School, and Matthew Jennejohn is
a former law clerk for then Vice Chancellor Leo Strine on the Delaware Court of Chancery and
current law professor at J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University) Vice
Chancellor Travis Laster, who has been called “Strine on steroids” has become the academic
liaison on the Delaware Court of Chancery now that former Chancellor Strine has moved to the
Delaware Supreme Court. Ashby Jones, On Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster: ‘Strine on
Steroids’, THE WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/11/ondelaware-vice-chancellor-travis-laster-strine-on-steroids/. Vice Chancellor Laster has written at
least fourteen legal articles (some before and some after assuming his position on the bench), has
lectured at various law schools, and has been involved in the Harvard Law School Program on
Corporate Governance. Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster, Harvard Law School Program on
Corporate Governance, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/laster-bio.shtml. Former
Delaware judges have been and are involved in legal academia, including former Chancellor Bill
Allen (NYU Law School), former Chief Justice Myron Steele (University of Virginia School of
Law) and former Justice Jack Jacobs (Columbia Law School and Vanderbilt Law School).
SCH.
OF
L.,
William
T.
Allen,
N.Y.U
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.biography&personid=19739
L.
SCH.,
(last
visited
Aug.
30,
2015);
Jack
B.
Jacobs,
COLUM.
http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Jack_Jacobs (last visited Aug. 30, 2015); Jack B. Jacobs,
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP http://www.sidley.com/people/jack-b-jacobs (last visited Aug. 31, 2015);
OF
VA.
SCH.
OF
L.,
Myron
T.
Steele,
U.
http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/faculty.nsf/FHPbI/1427463 (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
272. There are some obvious exceptions to the statement that judges in states other than
Delaware do not seem as involved with the legal academy. One notable exception is Judge
Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Richard A. Posner,
U. OF CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r (last visited Aug 30, 2015)
(noting Judge Posner’s position as a senior lecturer at the law school, as well as his numerous
academic articles and books). Judge Posner, however, is a federal judge and corporate law still is
primarily a state law subject.
273. Melissa Ip, 5 Social Enterprise Incubators and Accelerators You Should Know About,
SOC. ENTERPRISE BUZZ (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.socialenterprisebuzz.com/2012/10/03/5social-enterprise-incubators-and-accelerators-you-should-know-about/ (noting five major social
enterprise incubators). The number of social enterprise incubators has seemed to increase
exponentially since this article, though most of the incubators are young and small.
274. Gordon Smith, Utah Benefit Corporation Act, THE CONGLOMERATE (May 13, 2014),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/05/utah-benefit-corporation-act.html (wondering whether
corporate law professors should teach benefit corporation law in the general business
organizations class).
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the social enterprise law of the particular state that best communicates and
demonstrates its value to the legal academy.
C. Considering the Future
State laboratories have been hard at work. With the assistance of
proponents like B Lab, states have created various iterations of social
enterprise statutes and spawned numerous innovations, creating a number
of entirely new social enterprise entity types. This evolution is likely to
continue with over a dozen more states actively considering social
enterprise statutes. This experimentation by the states, allowed by
federalism, is part of what Professor Roberta Romano calls “the genius of
American corporate law.” 275 The evolution of social enterprise laws may
be the most significant business law product of the state laboratories in the
past decade. Professors Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein remind us in their
book The Law Market that firms are free to shop for these new laws. 276
Predicting the future can be a dangerous game, and at this early stage
it is difficult to tell whether any of the current social enterprise laws will
prove attractive enough to draw large numbers of entities. If the social
enterprise law market does heat up, predicting a winner of that competition
will also be difficult to do at the beginning of the race. On one hand,
smaller states may have more incentive to pursue social enterprise due to
the potentially significant positive impact on their smaller budgets. 277 On
the other hand, most social enterprises seem to be staying in their home
state currently, which favors large states like California and New York.
States with significant infrastructure to service business entities, like
Delaware and Nevada, also have a nice starting position because those
resources can be easily used for social enterprises in addition to other, more
traditional entity types. The early data on the formation of benefit
corporations shows Nevada with a strong lead, followed by Delaware, New
York, and California. 278 At this stage, however, it is still much too early to
declare a clear winner. In any event, as discussed above, the state
laboratories, prompted by a number of interest groups, have produced a
variety of social enterprise laws. 279 The evolution of these social enterprise
275. ROMANO, supra note 1.
276. ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
277. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 278 (1990)
(noting that corporate charter franchise taxes constitutes a relatively high percentage of
Delaware’s total budget).
278. See infra Appendix A; see also Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30
(explaining that the unique and easy benefit corporation check box on Nevada’s standard
incorporation form may be a factor in Nevada’s lead); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE
FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 5–12 (2013) (arguing for doing away with unnecessary complexity and
promoting more simple, common-sense processes).
279. See supra Part V.
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forms will be interesting to watch over the coming years, and states may
glean valuable lessons from the jurisdictional competition literature
involving more established entity types that this Article discussed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over less than a decade, we have seen a proliferation of social
enterprise forms in the United States. This Article describes some of the
evolution of these social enterprise forms and the state of the social
enterprise law market. Given the indeterminacy of benefit corporation law,
this Article posits that if social enterprises become more popular, a
dominant state could eventually engage in significant price discrimination
and collect significant revenue related to attracting social enterprises.
Currently, only a relatively small number of social enterprises have been
formed and thus the financial stakes are quite low. This Article suggests
that jurisdictional positioning and interest group theory, rather than serious
jurisdictional competition, explain why states are passing social enterprise
statutes. If social enterprise forms become more widely used in the future,
states may choose to compete more vigorously in the social enterprise area.
This Article suggests that interested states could learn from the Delaware
experience with traditional corporations, coupled with a few additional
suggestions, in any future attempt to attract social enterprises.
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Appendix A—Benefit Corporations and L3Cs

State

Benefit
Law
Effec280
tive

Benefit
Corporations
(Benefit
281
LLCs)

Date
Updated

L3C
Law
Effective

L3Cs
282

Date
Updated

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oglala Sioux
Tribe
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington D.C.

2014
2014
2012
2014
2014
2013
2014
2011
2015
2013
2012
2010
2012
2015
2015
2014
2014
2015
2011
2012
-

5
3
189
45
87
368
7
13
29
38
9
33 (50)
42
52
Not Effective
2
1130
26
5
245
-

11/2/15
10/27/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
10/28/15
11/2/15
10/27/15
10/28/15
10/27/15
11/2/15
10/27/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
N/A
10/21/15
10/19/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
-

2010
2010
2011
2009
2010 283
2009

203
240
63
332
95
1

11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15

2014
2013
2014
2012
2016
2014
2011
2011
2013

96 (590)
29
4
5
Not Effective
20
17
35
8

10/19/15
11/2/15
10/21/15
10/23/15
N/A
10/21/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
10/21/15

2012
2009
2008
-

6
73
210
-

11/2/15
11/2/15
11/2/15
-

280. State
by
State
Legislative
Status,
BENEFIT
CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
281. Kate Cooney, Justin Koushyar, and Matthew Lee assisted the author with collecting data
for earlier versions of this chart. Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30. For states
with an * next to the number, the author was unable to obtain recent data from the state and relied
on the data reported at http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp.
INTERSECTOR
PARTNERS,
L3C
(July
6,
2015),
282. L3C
Tally,
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html.
283. North Carolina repealed its L3C statute effective January 1, 2014, but the then-existing
L3Cs were allowed to continue. See Brewer, supra note 6.
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State

Benefit
Law
Effec280
tive

Benefit
Corporations
(Benefit
281
LLCs)

Date
Updated

L3C
Law
Effective

L3Cs

West Virginia
Wyoming
Total

2014
-

94
2636 (640)

10/19/15
-

2009

37
1266

282

Date
Updated
11/2/15

